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LEGISLATING MORALITY: 
MORAL THEORY AND TURPITUDINOUS 
CRIMES IN IMMIGRATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Abel Rodríguez* & Jennifer A. Bulcock** 
          Congress could have framed the country’s immigration policies in 
any number of ways. In significant part, it opted to frame them in moral 
terms. The crime involving moral turpitude is among the most pervasive 
and pernicious classifications in immigration law. In the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, it is virtually ubiquitous, appearing everywhere 
from the deportability and mandatory detention grounds to the 
inadmissibility and naturalization grounds. In effect, it acts as a 
gatekeeper for those who wish to enter and remain in the country, obtain 
lawful permanent residence, travel abroad after admission, or become 
United States citizens. With limited exceptions, noncitizens cannot 
obtain, maintain, or expeditiously surpass temporary status or lawful 
permanent residence without avoiding “turpitudinous conduct.” This 
Article challenges the moral turpitude designation as a moral concept. 
          Legal scholars, legislators, and judges have leveled an abundance 
of critiques against the moral turpitude designation, particularly for its 
vague nature. Absent from this discussion, however, is a dedicated 
analysis of moral turpitude as it relates to established moral frameworks. 
Rather than rely on the vast intellectual tradition regarding questions of 
morality and ethics, the courts have opted instead for legal insularity, 
developing a specious approach to moral turpitude that is utterly 
incoherent in moral terms. The result is an arbitrary and anachronistic 
approach to determining whether conduct is turpitudinous. Serious 
consideration of the designation vis-à-vis moral theory casts 
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considerable doubt on the virtually inscrutable standards that have 
evolved within moral turpitude jurisprudence. 
          Close analysis through the lens of moral theories, such as 
deontology, contractualism, and common morality, reveals why the 
crime involving moral turpitude should be eliminated from the country’s 
immigration laws. Under the pretense of protecting the country’s moral 
ethos, the legislature and courts have used the guise of morality to 
obfuscate an arbitrary mechanism of migration control. This Article 
demonstrates the limits of embedding explicit moral categories within the 
law and asserts that the judiciary has wielded morality as a proxy for its 
intent to exclude and remove broad swaths of noncitizens. Ultimately, a 
just immigration system must preclude the crime involving moral 
turpitude.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The crime involving moral turpitude is among the most pervasive 
and pernicious classifications in immigration law. In the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), the term can be found within the grounds 
of inadmissibility,1 the grounds of deportability,2 and the good moral 
character grounds for naturalization.3 In effect, it acts as a gatekeeper 
for those who wish to enter the United States, obtain lawful permanent 
residence, remain in the United States, travel abroad after admission, 
and become United States citizens. The crime involving moral 
turpitude subjects people to mandatory detention in immigration 
facilities4 and, to some extent, impacts most forms of relief from 
removal.5 With limited exceptions, noncitizens cannot obtain, 
maintain, or expeditiously surpass temporary status or lawful 
permanent residence in the United States without avoiding 
“turpitudinous conduct.” It is present at each stage of the immigration 
and removal process, acting as a legal barrier to those convicted of—
or, in some circumstances, simply admitting commission of—criminal 
conduct deemed morally objectionable under immigration law.6 
 
 1. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012). 
 2. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 3. Id. § 1101(f)(3). 
 4. Id. § 1226 (c)(1)(A)–(B). 
 5. See, e.g., id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb); id. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II)(bb); id. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(iii) (including that noncitizen is “a person of good moral character” in order to qualify 
for immigration relief under VAWA); id. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (requiring 
that a nonpermanent resident seeking cancellation of removal “has been a person of good moral 
character” during his or her ten or more years of continuous residence); id. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) 
(terminating the period of continuous residence required to qualify for cancellation of removal for 
noncitizens who have committed a crime of moral turpitude as delineated in § 1182(a)(2) or 
§ 1227(a)(2)); id. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (limiting voluntary departure to those noncitizens who have 
been persons of good moral character for at least five years immediately preceding application); id. 
§ 1255(a)(2) (providing that a noncitizen who commits, or admits committing acts which constitute, 
a crime of moral turpitude is inadmissible, and therefore ineligible to adjust status to a legal 
permanent resident under § 1255(a)(2)); id. § 1255(h)(2)(B) (precluding the attorney general from 
waiving inadmissibility due to commission of a crime of moral turpitude under § 1182(a)(2)(A) for 
a noncitizen seeking relief under Special Immigrant Juvenile Status); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.2(c)(1)(vii) (2019) (requiring that a self-petitioning spouse of an abusive citizen or legal 
permanent resident is a person of good moral character); 8 C.F.R. § 245.23(a)(4)–(5) (2013) 
(requiring that those who wish to adjust status from a nonimmigrant T-Visa to legal permanent 
residency are otherwise admissible and to have maintained good moral character since entering on 
a T-Visa); 8 C.F.R. § 240.65(c)(2) (2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(c)(2) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 240.66(c)(3) 
(2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c)(3) (2012) (limiting access to suspension of deportation and 
cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act to 
noncitizens demonstrating good moral character). 
 6. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (f)(3), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). These sections include not only 
those who are convicted of particular crimes but any “alien” who “admits having committed” or 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
2019] MORAL THEORY AND TURPITUDINOUS CRIMES 43 
Ostensibly, the virtual ubiquity of the crime involving moral 
turpitude within immigration law protects the nation from individuals 
lacking the desired moral constitution, serving to exclude people from 
entry or citizenship who may diminish the country’s moral fabric. In 
reality, however, it is a classification that has eschewed moral 
principles and whose evolution at the Board of Immigration Appeals7 
(the “Board”) and in the courts has broadened to such an extent that 
even minor, innocuous violations—including misdemeanors and 
summary offenses—result in severe immigration penalties.8 An 
examination of immigration jurisprudence over the past several 
decades reveals that inadmissibility and removal represent 
disproportionately punitive measures for activity that is difficult to 
defend as lacking morality.9 To be sure, the expansive interpretation 
of crimes involving moral turpitude has very real significance, 
resulting in adverse immigration consequences for untold numbers of 
noncitizens involved with or suspected of even petty crimes.10 
Utilizing the crime involving moral turpitude, the legislature, the 
Board, and the courts have wielded morality as a proxy for their intent 
to exclude and remove a broad range of individuals who may have 
engaged in criminal activity. For centuries, the courts have developed 
and expanded a moral barrier to regulate whether families are able to 
 
“admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements” of certain offenses. Although it 
is beyond the scope of this Article, inadmissibility and good moral character findings based on 
admission of an offense, rather than a conviction, leads to a host of problems, not the least of which 
include prompting noncitizens to incriminate themselves by eliciting disclosures of guilt and 
subsequently allowing immigration officials to determine whether particular behavior, as described 
by an applicant or respondent, constitutes the elements of a criminal offense. In the criminal 
context, such a complex determination would invoke the right to a jury. 
 7. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the administrative body for interpreting and 
applying immigration laws. Executive Office for Immigration Review, About the Office, Board of 
Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-
appeals (lasted updated Oct. 15, 2018). It has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain 
decisions rendered by immigration judges and by district directors of the Department of Homeland 
Security. Id. 
 8. Rob Doersam, Punishing Harmless Conduct: Toward a New Definition of “Moral 
Turpitude” in Immigration Law, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 547, 550–53 (2018) (discussing a specific case 
involving removal for a non-violent offense and Judge Posner’s view on the BIA developing a 
standard for examining that does not “sweep in harmless conduct”). 
 9. Amy Wolper, Unconstitutional and Unnecessary: A Cost/Benefit Analysis of “Crimes 
Involving Moral Turpitude” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 
1934–35 (2010). 
 10. While there are no precise data regarding the number of people impacted by moral 
turpitude findings, its existence for over a century, its pervasiveness in the immigration statutes, 
and its continually broadening definition in the courts make evident an intention to use the 
designation to impact a broad array of noncitizens convicted or suspected of crimes. 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
44 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:39 
reunite in this country, whether respondents have the opportunity to 
present equities to an immigration judge, and whether lawful 
permanent residents can naturalize and vote. The courts have 
perpetuated this moral classification while failing to acknowledge the 
extensive existing body of literature grappling with morality and 
ethics. In immigration cases dealing with moral turpitude, immigration 
officials and judges invariably make moral determinations while 
overlooking centuries of theory, discussion, and spirited intellectual 
debate regarding questions of morality. The result is an arbitrary and 
anachronistic approach to determining whether conduct involves 
moral turpitude. 
The judiciary, members of Congress, and legal scholars have 
leveled an abundance of legal critiques at the moral turpitude 
designation, particularly for its vague nature.11 Given the paucity of 
consideration given to the designation as a distinctly moral 
classification within the law, however, this Article seeks to examine 
the crime involving moral turpitude through the lens of moral theory. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that the crime involving moral turpitude 
must be eliminated from United States immigration jurisprudence 
because it is a purported moral classification that lacks support from 
any existing understanding of moral principles. Part II provides a brief 
description of the crime involving moral turpitude within the 
immigration legal context. Part III examines the crime involving moral 
turpitude through the lens of moral theory. This Part focuses primarily 
on the principles of common morality and Immanuel Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative, which serve to elucidate the shortcomings of 
the moral turpitude designation. Part IV considers the legal 
implications of an explicitly moral category within a legal system 
predicated on a categorical approach to crimes and stare decisis. 
II.  THE CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE 
The notion of moral turpitude has existed in United States 
jurisprudence for over two centuries.12 In 1891, the term was initially 
 
 11. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Doersam, supra 
note 8, at 549. 
 12. See Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2012). 
Simon-Kerr provides an extensive historical background of moral turpitude, tracing the term’s use 
through the law of defamation, evidence law, voting rights, and immigration law. Id. at 1001. 
Although use of the term predates its adoption into law, its formal acceptance as a legal standard is 
attributed to a case concerning slander per se in the early nineteenth century. Brooker v. Coffin, 5 
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incorporated into the country’s immigration laws.13 It appeared for the 
first time as a basis for deportation in the Immigration Act of 1917.14 
 
Johns., 188, 188–89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); see also Simon-Kerr, supra, at 1010 (describing the 
Brooker court’s usage of moral turpitude in connection with slander per se). 
 13. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084; see also S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 350 (1950) 
(tracing the evolution of the “crime of moral turpitude” in federal immigration law). The 
Immigration Act of 1891 was the first set of comprehensive immigration laws in the nation’s 
history. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 11–12 (8th ed. 2016). The act was passed at a time of pronounced violence, 
particularly against non-whites, and xenophobia. See id. at 12 (noting that the 1891 Act “mirrored 
the concerns about the biological inferiority of immigrants” by adding new categories of exclusion). 
By 1891, restrictionist immigration policies had taken root, Jim Crow laws were in full effect, and 
lynchings were not uncommon. See Randall M. Miller, Lynching in America: Some Context and a 
Few Comments, 72 PA. HIST.: J. MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 275, 278–79 (2005) (discussing how 
lynching was used as a form of racial and social control and means of maintaining ethnic purity 
during the Jim Crow era). In 1891, the Chinese Exclusion Act, banning all Chinese workers from 
entering the United States and obtaining citizenship, had been in effect for nine of its sixty-one 
years of existence. See ALEINIKOFF ET. AL., supra, at 153–55 (recounting the history of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act). Women were severely scrutinized and penalized on moral grounds, particularly for 
their sexual conduct. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1007. In the same year, the largest lynching 
in United States history took place in New Orleans, when a mob fueled by anti-immigrant sentiment 
killed eleven Italian-Americans. See Miller, supra, at 278 (“Indeed, the largest mass lynching in 
United States history was the 1891 murder of eleven Sicilian immigrants in New Orleans for 
allegedly assassinating the Irish-American police chief in Mafia fashion.”). More than one hundred 
black Americans were lynched. See Lynching, Whites and Negroes, 1882–1968, TUSKEGEE UNIV. 
ARCHIVES, http://192.203.127.197/archive/bitstream/handle/123456789/511/Lyching%201882% 
201968.pdf. The following year, 1892, the country reported a record 230 lynchings. Id.; see also 
1959 Tuskegee Institute Lynch Report, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr. 26, 1959, reprinted in 
RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHING (1988) (reporting that the most lynchings in any 
single year was 230 in 1892, according to Tuskegee Institute statistics). It is in this historical context 
that the crime involving moral turpitude was introduced to the nation’s immigration laws. 
 14. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889; see also 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05 (2019) (citing S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 390 (1916)) 
(“Deportation for criminal activities in the United States first appeared in the Immigration Act of 
1917 in response to a public outcry against the activities of noncitizen criminals.”); Jordan, 341 
U.S. at 229 n.14 (majority opinion) (“The term ‘moral turpitude’ first appeared in the Act of 
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, which directed the exclusion of ‘persons who have been convicted 
of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.’ Similar language 
was reenacted in the Statutes of 1903 and 1907.”). In 1917, heightened nativism in the United States 
motivated changes in the law that, coupled with existing policies, banned nearly all immigrants 
from the Asian continent. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 14–16. Class and race-based 
restrictionism led to the adoption of a literacy test and subsequently national quotas tied to 
admission. See id. at 13–14 (describing the immigration policies used to preserve the racial and 
ethnic status quo during the early twentieth century, including literacy tests and national quotas, 
and per se bans on certain countries such as Japan and China). Women’s suffrage would not be 
realized for another three years. Native Americans would be prohibited from United States 
citizenship for another seven years. Id. at 67 (explaining that the Supreme Court ruling that Native 
Americans were not citizens because they were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States 
was not reversed until Congress passed legislation in 1924 and later in 1940 to grant citizenship to 
those born in the United States). It would be more than two decades before Chinese, Indian, and 
Filipino immigrants would be eligible to naturalize, and it would be more than three decades before 
naturalization would become entirely race-neutral. See id. at 99–105 (describing the racial 
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Since the inception of its appearance within United States immigration 
law, it has lacked a statutory definition.15 Leaving the courts to 
interpret its significance, Congress has never provided any guidance 
regarding its meaning or scope.16 Despite congressional and judicial 
objections to the term’s ambiguity, it continues to occupy a prominent 
place among this country’s immigration laws.17 Judge Posner has 
offered one of the strongest condemnations of the classification, 
stating, “The concept of moral turpitude, in all its vagueness, rife with 
contradiction, a fossil, an embarrassment to a modern legal system, 
continues to do its dirty work.”18 In its current form, the crime 
 
restrictions in United States naturalization laws that precluded all but “free white person[s]” from 
naturalizing, expanded to include those of African descent in 1870, opened naturalization to Indian 
and Filipino immigrants only in 1946, and finally abolished racial prerequisites in 1952). 
 15. See H.R. REP. NO. 64-10384, at 8 (1916) (“[Y]ou know that a crime involving moral 
turpitude has not been defined. No one can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Jordan, 341 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Congress knowingly 
conceived it in confusion. During the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration, out of 
which eventually came the Act of 1917 in controversy, clear warning of its deficiencies was 
sounded and never denied.”); Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2019) (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (arguing that after “tortured attempts to find logical consistency” in the moral turpitude 
designation “the time is ripe for reconsideration” of the issue, particularly in light of recent void-
for vagueness determinations in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) and Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018)); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Berzon, J., dissenting) (deeming the Board’s precedential case law regarding the meaning of moral 
turpitude “a mess of conflicting authority”); Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 
2008) (calling the phrase crime involving moral turpitude “notoriously baffling”); H.R. REP. NO. 
64-10384 (1917) (explaining that Congress has not defined a crime involving moral turpitude). 
 18. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring). In his 
concurrence, Posner levels a linguistic critique, stating that the moral turpitude definitions 
“approach gibberish,” as well as his assessment of the legal profession more broadly, criticizing its 
affinity for antiquated verbiage and its penchant for jargon. Id. at 831–32. Legal scholars have also 
offered vigorous critiques of the crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Brian C. Harms, 
Redefining Crimes of Moral Turpitude: A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 260 
(2001) (arguing that, while not unconstitutionally vague, the definition of crimes involving moral 
turpitude is sufficiently vague and amorphous that Congress should intervene to define it); Mary 
Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 
648 (2012) (arguing that the crime involving moral turpitude is unconstitutionally vague and should 
be challenged in court); Lindsay M. Kornegay & Evan T. Lee, Why Deporting Immigrants for 
“Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” Is Now Unconstitutional, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 48, 48–49 (2017) (making the case that Supreme Court decision Johnson v. United States 
renders the crime involving moral turpitude unconstitutionally vague, despite previous contrary 
decisions); Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for-Vagueness 
Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 816 (2008) (explaining 
why previous Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose an argument that the crime involving 
turpitude designation is void due to vagueness and why the Court should hold that it is indeed 
unconstitutionally vague); Doersam, supra note 8, at 549 (“The [crime involving moral turpitude]’s 
vagueness is problematic for immigrants, because it fails to provide reasonable notice to noncitizens 
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involving moral turpitude, to deleterious effect, acts as a catchall for a 
myriad of offenses that do not trigger more clearly defined crime-
related statutes in the INA.19 
The crime involving moral turpitude does its “dirty work” in a 
somewhat arbitrary fashion. Often illogical and internally 
inconsistent, immigration law functions as a patchwork of statutes that 
lead, at times, to absurd results defying its own implicit policy 
reasoning.20 Statutes prohibiting conduct involving moral turpitude 
contribute to the confusion, leading to inconsistent treatment of 
noncitizens couched in moral terms. Within the INA, the grounds of 
deportability may treat a lawful permanent resident more harshly than 
the grounds of inadmissibility would treat an applicant for lawful 
permanent residence. A crime of moral turpitude that is punishable by 
one year of confinement, for instance, may lead to the removal of 
someone who has been lawfully admitted to the United States within 
the past five years, yet it would not bar a prospective noncitizen from 
gaining admission to the country.21 In other words, even if both 
 
regarding their excludability or removability from the United States,” allowing arbitrary and 
discriminatory immigration practices). 
 19. The crime involving moral turpitude is indeed particularly amorphous. Although other 
categories of criminal offenses within the INA, such as the controlled substance and aggravated 
felony grounds, provide more specificity statutorily, it is important to note, nonetheless, that they 
present their own complexities as well. See, e.g., Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 
2014) (holding that controlled substance offenses are divisible such that a modified categorical 
approach is appropriate); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the modified categorical approach may be used to determine whether the respondent’s conviction 
involved loss to a victim in excess of $10,000.00); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of 
the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 
1942 (2000) (“[A]lmost any infraction that occurs during the period of adjustment to life in the 
United States makes a legal permanent resident subject to mandatory deportation.”). 
 20. See Abel Rodríguez, Crimes and Immigration: Civil Advocacy for Noncitizens at the 
Intersection of Criminal and Immigration Law, in SOCIAL WORK WITH IMMIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES: LEGAL ISSUES, CLINICAL SKILLS, AND ADVOCACY 175, 176–77 (Fernando Chang-
Muy & Elaine P. Congress eds., 2d ed. 2016) (explaining that immigration law is rife with 
contradictions and internal inconsistencies that lead to incongruous results, such as rendering a 
legal permanent resident removable for conduct that would not prohibit another noncitizen from 
entering the United States). 
 21. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (providing that a noncitizen is deportable 
if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after admission, with no 
sentencing limitation), with id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (excluding a crime involving moral turpitude 
from the grounds for inadmissibility if the maximum possible penalty did not exceed one year of 
imprisonment and the noncitizen was not sentenced to more than six months imprisonment). The 
logical contradiction of removing noncitizens that would otherwise be admissible to the United 
States is also implicated by other offenses, such as firearms offenses and aggravated felonies. 
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any [noncitizen] who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”), with id. § 1182(a)(2) (declining to include 
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noncitizens had committed identical offenses carrying a maximum 
penalty of one year, an aspiring entrant finds herself in a favorable 
position as compared to a permanent resident who may have spent 
nearly five years integrating into her community and establishing 
positive equities in the country.22 
Similarly, under the INA’s grounds for inadmissibility, a lawful 
permanent resident may be subject to removal proceedings, while the 
grounds of deportability would have no impact on the same individual. 
This leads to questionable outcomes that are unsupportable in moral 
terms. For example, a lawfully admitted noncitizen may commit a 
crime of moral turpitude five years after admission without facing 
removal proceedings.23 If that same noncitizen travels abroad, 
however, she may be placed in removal proceedings upon her return.24 
Denying reentry to noncitizens that otherwise would not be subject to 
removal, provided they remain in the country, defies logic.25 It is 
 
aggravated felony as a grounds for inadmissibility); compare id. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (rendering a 
noncitizen deportable for any conviction under any law for “purchasing, selling, offering for sale, 
exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying” or even “attempting or conspiring” such 
actions with regards to a firearm or destructive device), with id. § 1182(a)(2) (lacking a sweeping 
grounds for inadmissibility for firearms offenses and providing exceptions for certain crimes 
involving moral turpitude with short sentences). 
 22. The importance within immigration policy of lawful permanent residents accruing positive 
equities is evident given its significance in determining eligibility for cancellation of removal for 
certain permanent residents. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)–(3); see also C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 
(B.I.A. 1998) (“In some cases, the minimum equities required to establish eligibility for relief under 
section 240A(a) . . . may be sufficient in and of themselves to warrant favorable discretionary 
action.”); Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195, 198–99 (B.I.A. 1990) (“In balancing the various 
factors in the respondent’s case, we take note of his favorable equities, which we found to be 
unusual or outstanding. However . . . we weigh these equities against the adverse factors of his 
extensive criminal record . . . .”). 
 23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012). 
 24. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the Fleuti Doctrine allowed lawful permanent residents 
whose departure from the United States was “brief, casual, and innocent” to return to the country 
without seeking admission. Id. § 1255a(a)(3)(B). Since 1996, however, IIRIRA dictates that 
reentering noncitizens are subject to admissions procedures, potentially resulting in removal 
proceedings for those having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Id. § 1101(a)(13) (defining 
“admission” and “admitted” to include any lawful “entry . . . into the United States after inspection 
and authorization by an immigration officer,” with no separate treatment for legal permanent 
residents returning from brief departures). 
 25. The logical contradiction of denying admission to a noncitizen that has traveled abroad 
and would not otherwise be removable from the United States is also implicated by other offenses. 
For example, a noncitizen convicted of possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana would not 
be removable from the United States. If that noncitizen were to travel abroad, however, she would 
be subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (excluding a 
single offense involving thirty grams or less of marijuana for one’s own use from removable 
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difficult to comprehend how traveling abroad—in and of itself—
exacerbates culpability, diminishes a person’s morality, or adversely 
impacts a person’s desirability as a resident of the country. 
While the statutory construction of the INA leads to illogical 
results, case law does little to provide clarity or lend legitimacy to the 
moral turpitude designation. The Board defines the crime involving 
moral turpitude as “a nebulous concept which refers generally to 
conduct which is base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules 
of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s 
fellow man or society in general.”26 The vague nature of the term has 
led circuit courts, which have almost invariably adopted the Board’s 
definition, to grapple with its consistent application to a broad array of 
criminal offenses.27 As a result, case outcomes have varied 
considerably among the courts of appeals and within the Board itself.28 
Furthermore, the imprecise nature of the classification, as overtly 
admitted by the Board, provides little comfort to noncitizens 
attempting to determine whether they will be subject to the severe 
consequences stemming from turpitudinous conduct. 
As the Board and the courts have attempted to give form and 
substance to the moral turpitude designation, they have created a 
cumbersome body of decisions that is challenging to navigate even for 
immigration experts. They have largely skirted the challenges 
associated with determining what is “base, vile, depraved,” or within 
“accepted rules of morality,” developing instead an approach 
prohibiting per se most activity involving fraudulent or sexually illicit 
conduct and, at the periphery of those categories of crimes, relying 
primarily on the mens rea associated with a given offense.29 Fraud has 
 
controlled substance offenses), with id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (violating any controlled substance 
regulation renders a noncitizen inadmissible, regardless of quantity). 
 26. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980); see also Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 
868 (B.I.A. 1994) (“Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or 
depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to 
society in general.”); Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988) (“Moral turpitude is a 
nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being 
inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between 
man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.”). 
 27. See supra note 17. 
 28. See Wolper, supra note 9, at 1911–12 (noting the variation between courts about what 
specific crimes constitute crimes involving moral turpitude, despite widespread acceptance of 
common definitions and categories). 
 29. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1060 (“Rather than make the kind of case-specific, fact-
specific, era-specific inquiry advocated by Judge Hand, federal courts handled the moral turpitude 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
50 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:39 
generally been considered the central element to moral turpitude 
determinations,30 and nearly all sex offenses, regardless of the 
associated intent or resultant effect, involve moral turpitude.31 Even 
statutory rape, generally a strict liability offense, has been deemed to 
involve moral turpitude.32 Antiquated honor norms, rather than 
contemporary moral principles, form the basis for these per se 
categories.33 
For offenses that do not involve fraud or sex, the Board and courts 
typically turn to scienter to determine whether a crime involves moral 
 
question by citing precedent that reproduced its core applications and then by looking for the 
element of scienter to resolve cases at the margins.”). 
 30. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) (“Without exception, federal and state 
courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude.”). 
 31. The federal courts have long held that sexual offenses violate “accepted moral standards” 
and come within the category of “grave acts of baseness or depravity” and have thus applied the 
moral turpitude designation to a wide variety of sex-based offenses. See, e.g., Morales v. Gonzales, 
478 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (communicating with a child for immoral purposes is a crime 
involving moral turpitude); Sheikh v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“conviction under North Dakota law for encouraging or contributing to the deprivation or 
delinquency of a minor involved moral turpitude”); Maghsoudi v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., 181 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that indecent assault is a crime involving moral 
turpitude); Palmer v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 4 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a crime involving moral turpitude); Castle v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976) (“It is well established 
that the Maryland statutory offense of carnal knowledge of a female between the ages of fourteen 
and sixteen years ‘manifestly involves moral turpitude.’”); Marciano v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a statutory rape conviction 
is a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude); Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 394 
(9th Cir. 1949) (finding that lewd and lascivious conduct is a crime involving moral 
turpitude). Additionally, courts have found that sexual offenses involve moral turpitude, regardless 
of injury to the victim. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., 
dissenting) (“Unlike other types of crimes falling into the category of grave and base acts, sexual 
offenses have generally been classified as crimes involving moral turpitude irrespective of any 
injury to the victim, physical or otherwise.”). 
 32. Mehboob v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding 
misdemeanor indecent assault is a crime of moral turpitude, regardless of the fact that it does not 
contain mens rea element as to the age of the victim); Castle, 541 F.2d at 1066 (finding statutory 
rape “manifestly involves moral turpitude”); Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1023–25 (holding that “if 
sexual intercourse is present, and . . . the female is under the age of consent, the element of mens 
rea does not enter because of the very nature of the offense and the interest of society in rendering 
such females incapable of giving consent”). 
 33. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1013–14. Simon-Kerr explains that these honor norms 
are derived particularly from concerns about honest business dealings and punishing women who 
were not chaste. Id. Given the centrality of Christianity in public life in England, the United States, 
and in the common law of both nations, it stands to reason that these honor norms presumably may 
be rooted in Christian values. See generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the 
Common Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27 (1998) (describing the role of Christianity in the development 
of common law). 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
2019] MORAL THEORY AND TURPITUDINOUS CRIMES 51 
turpitude. In Flores,34 the Board explains, “The test to determine if a 
crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a 
vicious motive or corrupt mind. An evil or malicious intent is said to 
be the essence of moral turpitude.”35 Indeed, the determination as to 
whether conduct involves moral turpitude typically hinges on scienter, 
whether stated explicitly in the relevant criminal statute or inferred by 
the adjudicator. From assault and arson to theft and counterfeiting 
offenses, intent is generally considered the touchstone of moral 
turpitude.36 Nevertheless, the Board and courts have expanded their 
approach to moral turpitude over time, now finding that even some 
reckless offenses involve turpitudinous conduct.37 
III.  MORAL TURPITUDE AND MORAL THEORY 
Congress could have framed the country’s immigration policies 
in any number of ways. It opted to frame them, in significant part, in 
moral terms. Particularly within the disciplines of philosophy and 
theology, there has been no lack of consideration for the profoundly 
complex matters of moral action, right and wrong, and duties owed to 
our fellow members of society. Conspicuously absent in the existing 
moral turpitude case law, however, are any mention of, or regard for, 
established notions of moral thought. Rather than rely on the vast 
 
 34. 17 I. & N. Dec. 225 (B.I.A. 1980).  
 35. Id. at 230 (finding that uttering or selling false or counterfeit paper relating to registry of 
aliens inherently involves the intent to deceive and is, therefore, a crime involving moral turpitude). 
 36. See Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921–22 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Flores, 17 I. & N. 
Dec. at 227) (explaining that a crime involving moral turpitude “necessarily involves an evil intent 
or maliciousness in carrying out a reprehensible act”). 
 37. See, e.g., Baptiste v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 841 F.3d 601, 621–22 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(finding New Jersey conviction for reckless second-degree aggravated assault to be a crime 
involving moral turpitude); Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated alone would not constitute a crime involving 
moral turpitude, doing so while endangering a child demonstrates a conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk to a child that is sufficient to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude); Keungne 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding criminal reckless conduct under 
Georgia law was a crime involving moral turpitude); Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 
849 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that recklessly causing serious physical injury to another person is a 
crime involving moral turpitude because causing physical injury is an aggravating factor that 
increases the culpability of the offense); Franklin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 72 F.3d 
571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding it was not unreasonable for the BIA to find that “an alien who 
recklessly causes the death of her child by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk to life has committed a crime that involves moral turpitude”); Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 
613–14 (B.I.A. 1976) (explaining “that moral turpitude can lie in criminally reckless conduct” 
because “a corrupt or vicious mind is not controlling” in determining whether assault with a deadly 
weapon is morally turpitudinous). 
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intellectual tradition concerning issues of morality and ethics in 
framing their moral category, the Board and courts have opted instead 
for legal insularity, developing a standard for morality devoid of either 
a systematic approach to considering the “rules of morality,” or 
established frameworks for moral consideration. 
Of course, relying on diverse disciplines in creating legal 
standards and rendering legal decisions is, by no means, 
unprecedented or even uncommon. The law does not, and should not, 
exist in a vacuum. A few landmark decisions at the nation’s highest 
court are illustrative of judicial reliance on scholarly expertise derived 
from various disciplines. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,38 for instance, the 
Supreme Court relied considerably on the testimony of scholars of 
religion and education in holding that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prevented the state from compelling Amish parents to 
oblige their children to attend high school after the eighth grade.39 In 
similar fashion, the Court gave notable deference in Roe v. Wade40 to 
medical standards in holding that Texas criminal statutes prohibiting 
abortions at any stage of pregnancy, except to save the life of the 
mother, were unconstitutional.41 Additionally, in Brown v. Board of 
Education,42 the decision legally ending the scourge of racial 
segregation in public schools, the reasoning was famously bolstered 
by the scholarship of social scientists.43 
Immigration law is riddled with legal fiction.44 Among its 
persistent fictions is the notion that moral principles inhere in moral 
 
 38.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 39. Id. 
 40.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 41. Id. at 148–50 (explaining how modern medical techniques in performing abortion 
undermine the argument that criminal abortion statutes are needed to protect women from unsafe 
medical practices). 
 42.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 43. Id. at 494–95 (citing to social science scholars to support the proposition that legally 
mandated segregation stigmatizes black children and negatively affects their educational 
outcomes). 
 44. For example, under immigration law, a noncitizen who has lived and lawfully worked in 
the United States, such as a DACA recipient, has not been “admitted” to the United States. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2012) (defining admission as “the lawful entry . . . into the United States 
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer,” and thus excluding those who enter 
without inspection, including DACA recipients). An “aggravated felony” need not include 
aggravating factors nor be a felony under state law to trigger immigration consequences. See 
Guerrero-Perez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the term “aggravated felony” can include crimes classified as misdemeanors under state law). 
Detention and deportation are not considered punishment. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 
(2003) (“[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally 
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turpitude determinations. Although the moral turpitude designation 
purports to regulate moral depravity, judges have invariably eschewed 
an approach requiring meaningful application of moral principles or 
consideration of social mores. As a consequence of circumventing 
moral thought for over a century, the Board and courts have developed 
a specious approach to moral turpitude that is utterly incoherent in 
moral terms. Within moral theory, no framework exists that mirrors 
the approach to moral turpitude. No moral theory centers on fraud and 
sex and, absent those specific categories of activity, determines moral 
worth based on intent. In fact, serious consideration of moral turpitude 
vis-à-vis moral theory casts considerable doubt on the virtually 
inscrutable standards that have evolved within moral turpitude 
jurisprudence. 
A.  The Crime Involving Moral Turpitude as Defined 
1.  The “Accepted Rules of Morality” 
One may object to consideration of the crime involving moral 
turpitude through the lens of contemporary moral theory, arguing that 
the notion of morality at play is not to be understood as a system of 
morality espousing objective truths, but rather as a conventional 
morality, i.e., a morality reached by social consensus. Support for this 
claim is found in Justice Jackson’s dissent in Jordan v. De George.45 
In his dissent, Justice Jackson mentions the respondent’s claim that the 
distinction between mala prohibita and mala in se can be used to 
determine which crimes should be considered crimes involving moral 
turpitude.46 However, he contends that this distinction has historically 
been unclear and argues that the conception of crimes involving moral 
turpitude set forth by the government is meant to “be measured against 
the moral standards that prevail in contemporary society to determine 
whether the violations are generally considered essentially 
 
valid aspect of the deportation process.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 
(1893) (holding that deportation and removal are not criminal punishments); see also César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Lifting the Legal Fiction that Immigration Detention Isn’t 
Punishment, CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 10, 2017), http://crimmigration.com/2017/03/10/lifting-the-
legal-fiction-that-immigration-detention-isnt-punishment/ (arguing that “[r]ecent developments 
suggest that the rationale underlying the legal conclusion that immigration detention isn’t punitive 
might be ripe for attack,” such as public justification of civil immigration detention as a deterrent, 
and the harsh conditions of confinement, including solitary confinement). 
 45. 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
 46. Id. at 236–37 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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immoral.”47 This approach is morality by consensus and may, in fact, 
be the most appropriate interpretation of what the Board means in 
defining crimes involving moral turpitude when they refer to “the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between man and 
man.”48 If this approach is in fact intended by the Board, it is 
problematic. 
As Justice Jackson instructively asks, “[h]ow should we ascertain 
the moral sentiments of masses of persons on any better basis than a 
guess?”49 He is here pointing to an inherent problem with morality by 
consensus: it is near impossible to define reliably or determine what 
moral consensus is in practice. Further reinforcing this sentiment, 
Justice Jackson footnotes Justice Learned Hand, who states: 
Even though we could take a poll, it would not be enough 
merely to count heads, without any appraisal of the voters. A 
majority of the votes of those in prisons and brothels, for 
instance, ought scarcely to outweigh the votes of accredited 
churchgoers. Nor can we see any reason to suppose that the 
opinion of clergymen would be a more reliable estimate of 
our own.50 
Without being able to determine definitively the common morality 
functioning within a society, any judgments made under the guise of 
such a theory are inherently suspicious. Justice Jackson, recognizing 
this eventuality, later states in his dissent that “[w]e usually end up by 
condemning all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason 
than that we disapprove of it.”51 In essence, an appeal to common 
morality is an appeal to a fictitious standard of morality that cannot 
reliably be determined, which culminates in judges making decisions 
in light of their own moral commitments. This assessment appears 
uncontroversial when one considers the conflicting decisions found 
among previous moral turpitude cases.52 If judges and courts cannot 
 
 47. Id. at 237. 
 48. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 49. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 238. 
 50. Id. at 238 n.11 (quoting Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 51. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 242. 
 52. See Moore, supra note 18, at 815 n.16 (noting conflicting decisions on whether being an 
accessory after the fact constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude), 839 n.280 (conflicting results 
on whether misuse of a Social Security number is a crime involving moral turpitude), 839 n.282 
(identifying conflicting decisions regarding crimes with elements of fraud); Wolper, supra note 9, 
at 1912 n.30 (noting instances where courts evaluating the same crime have reached opposite 
conclusions on whether it is a crime involving moral turpitude), 1942 n.213 (contrasting conflicting 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
2019] MORAL THEORY AND TURPITUDINOUS CRIMES 55 
possibly be functioning within the confines of a common morality, and 
are ultimately only appealing to their personal moral commitments, it 
appears that the sense of morality appealed to is nothing more than the 
considered moral judgments of an individual. In the words of Justice 
Jackson, “[t]hat is not government by law.”53 
To explain further the problems with common morality, the 
writings of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. are instructive. Discussing the 
postmodern context contemporary bioethics—and morality 
generally—finds itself in, Engelhardt challenges the idea that a secular 
society like the United States is capable of determining any content-
full morality by which it can guide the actions of its citizens. He states: 
Substantial differences in belief and moral vision remain and 
define action, character, and virtue. These differences shape 
living communities of diverse moral understanding . . . . 
Morality is available on two levels: the content-full morality 
of moral friends, and the procedural morality binding moral 
strangers. As a consequence, much must be allowed in large-
scale secular states that many . . . know to be grievously 
wrong and morally disordered. This circumstance will 
disappoint those who hoped that general society or a large-
scale state would constitute the moral community, which 
could be guided by the content-full secular [morality]. Their 
hope is sociologically ungrounded and, in terms of the 
possibility of a secular morality, unjustifiable. Large-scale 
states compass numerous peaceable moral communities, a 
diversity that states have no secular moral right to suppress.54 
Engelhardt acknowledges the plurality of moral communities that 
exist within large-scale states like the United States and the lack of 
justification for trying to enforce any particular vision of morality. 
Vermont Supreme Court Justice James Morse, when considering 
how the concept of moral turpitude applies in the separate context of 
the professional behavior of lawyers, expresses similar sentiments.55 
 
decisions on whether disorderly conduct and joyriding constitute crimes involving moral turpitude); 
see also Patrick J. Campbell, Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: In Search of a Moral 
Approach to Immoral Crimes, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 147, 160–63 (2014) (describing the 
conflicting results federal appellate courts and the Board have reached on whether particular crimes, 
in factually similar circumstances, constitute crimes involving moral turpitude). 
 53. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 240. 
 54. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 9–10 (2d ed. 1996). 
 55. In re Berk, 602 A.2d. 946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., concurring). 
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He states, “[A]s society has increasingly become both more secular 
and pluralistic, there is less consensus about what is immoral.”56 He 
continues, “[M]oral turpitude is a compass with the directional needle 
removed. We are left only the temptation to label behavior we find 
personally repugnant ‘immoral.’”57 Due to the plurality of moral 
visions and an inability to rank any particular view as dominant or 
more justified than another, one is left with intractable moral 
disagreement. While one way out of this problem would be to allow 
the majority perspective to rule, the inevitable consequence of this 
solution is to deny those in the minority the right to realize the full 
vision of their moral lives. Such a state of affairs is in direct tension 
with the specifically American ideal of the autonomous individual. 
When it comes to determining which morality should guide a 
particular society, allowing the greatest number to rule may satisfy 
practical considerations, but it lacks any substantial justification for 
why that particular vision of morality is preferable to any other. Such 
an application of morality is biased, unjust, and prevents noncitizens 
from being able to foresee how the current moral standard would be 
applied to them.58 
The words of Justices Jackson and Morse and the attendant 
conflicting decisions on what constitutes a crime involving moral 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. For void for vagueness arguments, see, for example, Nate Carter, Comment, Shocking the 
Moral Conscience of Mankind: Using International Law to Define “Crimes Involving Moral 
Turpitude” in Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 955, 956 (2006) (“The statute which 
establishes CIMTs [crimes involving moral turpitude] as a basis for removal also fails to inform 
aliens, judges and administrators of exactly what CIMTs are . . . this results in case law founded on 
reflexive citation to precedent or reliance on personal prejudice because the statute provides no 
basis for objective analysis.”); Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness 
Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (2016) (arguing for “the void for vagueness doctrine to 
apply greater scrutiny, as appropriate, to federal statutes that impose adverse immigration 
consequences on prior criminal activity for noncitizens residing in the United States”); Harms, 
supra note 18, at 260 (proposing that Congress define “crime involving moral turpitude” to combat 
the vague, ambiguous concept that fails to provide noncitizens adequate notice of what behavior is 
impermissible); Holper, supra note 18, at 648–49 (explaining why the courts should find the crime 
involving moral turpitude is void for vagueness, in a case presenting an as-applied challenge to a 
crime that is not an “easy” offense to resolve and thus falls outside the Jordan decision); Moore, 
supra note 18, at 816 (identifying flaws in the Jordan decision that leave open the possibility of a 
void-for-vagueness challenge to the CIMT and why such a claim should succeed under Supreme 
Court void-for-vagueness doctrine); Wolper, supra note 9, at 1909–19 (arguing that the crime 
involving moral turpitude is intolerably imprecise in the context of modern immigration law, and 
especially since the 1996 immigration law reforms, and thus the courts should find the term void 
for vagueness). 
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turpitude are further supplemented by the history of the debate over 
common morality within contemporary philosophy. This debate is 
most prominent in contemporary discussions over the appropriate 
moral principles to guide medical decision-making within the field of 
bioethics. Like law, medicine is a practically oriented discipline that 
requires moral guidance at the level of individual practitioners and 
patients and, therefore, appeals to wholly theoretical approaches to 
morality are untenable. However, theories of common morality, 
interpreted as ‘morality by consensus,’ have been eschewed by most 
contemporary philosophers, including Beauchamp and Childress, 
because they are “historical products relative to cultures” and, 
therefore, cannot be understood as “the set of norms shared by all 
persons committed to morality . . . applicable to all persons in all 
places [by which] we rightly judge all human conduct by its 
standards.”59 
What distinguishes the common morality discussed by Justice 
Jackson from a truly universal common morality,60 like the one 
Beauchamp and Childress discuss, is the fact that on Beauchamp and 
Childress’s account, “the common morality is not relative to cultures 
or individuals, because it transcends both.”61 For the moral turpitude 
designation to be a truly fair concept, it must be supported by a 
common morality like the one espoused by Beauchamp and 
Childress—that is, a truly universal common morality, and not the 
shallow notion unearthed by Justice Jackson’s dissent. Such an 
approach presumes “all morally committed persons share an 
admiration of and endorsement of some moral ideals, and in this 
respect those ideals can be said to be shared moral beliefs in the 
common morality.”62 However, the moral ideals that this version of 
common morality rely on are different from moral principles and 
rules, which are binding. As Beauchamp and Childress state, 
“[m]orality includes nonbinding moral ideals that individuals and 
 
 59. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 3 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
 60. When discussing a “truly universal common morality,” it is important to note that such a 
morality is abstract—that is, completely removed from socio-cultural-historical considerations—
meaning that any rational agent would be able to access and appreciate such a system of morality. 
However, a morality divorced from real-world context is not useful for guiding or evaluating 
specific moral actions. Hence, why conflicting systems of morality exist in practice. 
 61. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 59, at 4. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
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groups accept and act on, communal norms that bind only members of 
specific moral communities.”63 That is, while there are overarching 
moral ideals, like “killing is wrong,” moral communities actualize 
them differently, leading to the adoption of different moral rules and 
principles.64 
So, even on this account we can claim that there are moral ideals 
shared by all, but to be able to apply them in the real world would 
require a very limited notion of morality, with very few moral 
principles, and serious contextual consideration of the situation one 
hopes to assess morally. Once again, under this definition of common 
morality, it seems current moral turpitude designations cannot be 
understood on this model. The categorical approach to turpitudinous 
conduct identifies rules of morality that are far too specific to be 
considered moral ideals capable of being shared among all moral 
communities.65 Furthermore, the contextual approach required by 
moral ideals is lost in the abstract way in which crimes involving 
moral turpitude are evaluated, making it impossible to consider the 
noncitizen’s context or intention during the commission of an act. 
Julia Ann Simon-Kerr aptly observes that the categorical approach is 
“a formalistic approach that prevents [courts] from probing below the 
surface of a conviction to any of the facts that might inform a moral 
judgment about the act.”66 Consequently, on any available 
interpretation of common morality, the standards found in United 
States immigration law for judging turpitudinous conduct cannot be 
moral standards. 
2.  The “Duties Owed to Others” 
Returning to consider the language of the moral turpitude 
definition set forth by the Board, the suggestion that one has “duties 
owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in 
general” suggests that there are moral duties generated by one’s 
 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. WALTER SINOTT-ARMSTRONG & ROBERT AUDI, RATIONALITY, RULES, AND IDEALS: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON BERNARD GERT’S MORAL THEORY viii (2002); see BERNARD GERT, 
COMMON MORALITY: DECIDING WHAT TO DO (2004). Bernard Gert is well known in some circles 
for his work on “common morality.” See GERT, supra. A strategic decision was made to use 
Beauchamp and Childress’s approach rather than Gert’s because Beauchamp and Childress set forth 
an approach fully within the context of an applied ethics—bioethics—whereas Gert, while 
informed by his work in clinical ethics, does not. 
 65. See infra Section III.A. 
 66. Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1007. 
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obligations to other individuals or to society in general.67 This kind of 
language is very familiar to the social contract tradition within 
philosophy, which traditionally generates our moral and political 
duties and rights through an imagining of uncivilized individuals—
usually referring to those lacking a supreme authority like God or the 
government—contracting to limit their unfettered freedom for the 
benefit and protection of all.68 That is, each individual agrees to give 
up certain freedoms, for example, taking what they want, in exchange 
for protection, such as rules and punishments regarding theft or bodily 
harm, and other beneficial goods granted to them by the social 
contract, such as sharing of knowledge or resources.69 The contract is 
most commonly enforceable by the state.70 Among the most well-
known traditional social contract theorists are Thomas Hobbes,71 John 
Locke,72 and John-Jacques Rousseau.73 
Within the social contract tradition there is a division between 
contractarians and contractualists. The difference here is that the 
contractarian is concerned with how self-interested individuals can 
make mutually advantageous agreements, while the contractualist 
recognizes the equal moral worth of all agents and therefore seeks to 
pursue her own interests in a way that is justifiable to others who are 
also pursuing their own interests.74 For the discussion at hand, the 
contractualist account is preferable because—much like the United 
States legal system, which recognizes all individuals, at least in theory, 
as equal before the law—it attributes equal worth to all rational and 
 
 67. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 68. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 275–77, 330–31 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (describing how people living in the chaotic and disordered 
state of nature may enter into a compact to create a body politic, or government, that restrains 
violence and promotes order in a society, while constraining some of the freedom enjoyed in the 
state of nature). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 330–33 (explaining how, by consenting to form a political society, man exits the 
state of nature and cedes certain powers of enforcement, for example protection of property and 
punishment for misdeeds, to a shared government). 
 71. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Hackett Publ’g Co., 1994) (1668). 
 72. LOCKE, supra note 68. 
 73. JEAN-JACQUES ROSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY (Donald A. Cress 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., 1992) (1755); SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON 
HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU ix (Christopher W. Morris, ed. 1999). 
 74. For further discussion of the distinction between contractarians and contractualists, see 
Elizabeth Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Aug. 30, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/. 
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autonomous agents.75 If one were to take a contractarian approach, the 
contractarian would only be willing to limit her own self-interest if she 
were explicitly required to do so by law (i.e., the social contract). 
Additionally, given well-recognized concerns regarding the vagueness 
of moral turpitude legislation and what constitutes turpitudinous 
conduct, it appears that a contractarian would resist working within an 
inherently vague system of law.76 The contractualist, on the other 
hand, may be better able to accommodate the vagueness of moral 
turpitude legislation because she, as a rational agent, is inherently 
concerned with justifying her behavior to others and is able to do so 
by considering what a reasonable person would not object to.77 That 
is, the individual, as a rational, autonomous, moral agent, would be 
able to determine what behaviors would not be justifiable, effectively 
eliminating any vagueness in moral turpitude law. Thus, because the 
agent is independently able to make moral judgments, the claim that 
crimes involving moral turpitude are too vague to guide actions is 
easily addressed by the contractualist. 
Thomas Scanlon, who sets forth his contractualist account in his 
book titled What We Owe to Each Other, is perhaps the most well-
known contemporary contractualist.78 According to his theory, “an act 
is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of 
behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement.”79 On Scanlon’s account, the wrongness 
of an action is constituted by the fact that it is unjustifiable to others.80 
Having fundamental concern for whether we can justify our actions to 
others gives priority to our relationships to others and guarantees that 
if we are moral, we provide them with the full respect that a rational, 
autonomous being deserves.81 As a rational, autonomous being, one is 
 
 75. Id. Morality, like law, recognizes that those who are not fully rational or autonomous—
for example, children or those with cognitive impairments—present special cases and therefore 
may have mitigated or enhanced rights, duties, or protections depending on the specific case. 
 76. See In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., concurring). 
 77. This is especially true of Thomas Scanlon’s account. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT 
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (2000). Scanlon is the most well-recognized, contemporary 
contractualist and it is his account that will be representative of the contractualist approach in this 
paper. Ashford & Mulgan, supra note 74. 
 78. SCANLON, supra note 77. 
 79. Id. at 153. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 154. 
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also capable of determining what others might deem unjustifiable 
conduct. For Scanlon, unjustifiability is established if one can 
reasonably reject the intended action.82 Reasonable rejection requires 
not only a direct harm to an individual but also, to be reasonable, 
consideration of the harms to others if the action were not to be 
taken.83 Essentially there is a version of the “burdens principle” 
invoked by reasonable rejection: one may only reasonably reject an 
action if the harm one will suffer from the performance of the action 
is greater than the harm others would suffer if the action was not taken. 
Therefore, reasonable rejection requires consideration of all others and 
their interests when determining whether an action is unjustifiable.84 
Because Scanlon’s account gives significant focus to what we 
owe to each other, it is a good fit for addressing issues within 
immigration law—specifically the moral turpitude designation—
because it takes seriously how we might be bound to others to whom 
we do not have formal legal obligations. In particular, we need to 
consider what obligations noncitizens have to United States citizens 
and vice versa. However, taking seriously the idea of having to justify 
behaviors to all rational, autonomous beings results in significant 
obligations not only for noncitizens entering or remaining in the 
United States but also for United States citizens considering how they 
ought to act regarding noncitizens. 
On Scanlon’s contractualist approach, it stands to reason that 
noncitizens, under moral turpitude law, will be answerable for any and 
all behaviors that are found to be morally unjustifiable to others. For 
example, with cases of assault that are not explicitly prohibited by the 
laws of one’s country of origin, it is easy to see that without a reason 
sufficient to override the harm caused to another, such as self-defense 
or preventing serious harm to another, one would be unjustified in 
assaulting another. Therefore, denial of entry to or continued residence 
within the United States to a noncitizen who commits an inexcusable 
assault would be justified on this account. The noncitizen should have 
been able to determine that the action was unjustifiable, and therefore, 
the lack of existing law in the country of origin would not be a 
justifiable excuse. Consequently, enforcement of the moral turpitude 
standard would be permissible and justifiable. 
 
 82. See id. at 213–14. 
 83. Id. at 195–97. 
 84. Id. 
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However, Scanlon’s contractualist approach also requires 
consideration of the duties United States citizens have to noncitizens. 
When considering the supposed harms done to United States citizens 
by allowing noncitizens to enter or remain within the United States, 
the bar for denial is rather high on any interpretation of the burdens 
principle. Assuming a noncitizen has not committed a crime involving 
moral turpitude, discoverable by considering what constitutes an 
unjustifiable action, United States citizens must have a justifiable 
reason to deny entry to or continued residence within the United 
States. It would require a significant level of harm for United States 
citizens to override the interests of the noncitizen. 
While full consideration of which cases of exclusion would be 
justifiable is far too involved to be fully fleshed out within the confines 
of this Article, many of the proposed justifications for denial are set 
forth in the open versus closed borders debate. Justifications for 
maintaining closed borders typically include reasons, such as 
preserving a state’s culture,85 sustaining the economy,86 distributing 
state benefits,87 and national security.88 Therefore, one must weigh the 
 
 85. The concern here is that a state has the right to preserve its distinctive culture, which 
purportedly is threatened by the introduction of noncitizens from other cultures. The problem with 
this concern is that it is not obvious that individuals have a moral right to the protection of their 
culture, and it would only preclude immigration from countries that have significantly different 
cultures from the United States. 
 86. Here the concern is that an influx of immigrants would harm the economy, especially by 
“stealing” jobs from United States citizens. While unskilled laborers may be most threatened in this 
case, it is not clear there is a moral right to those jobs for United States citizens. Additionally, it 
seems the economy would benefit from immigration by increasing cheap labor and increasing the 
demand for goods. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, 
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 4–7 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston 
eds., 1997) (using a basic economic model to demonstrate the benefit to the United States economy 
of immigration, which results in net economic gain and increased employment opportunities for 
native-born workers, although some workers, usually in unskilled or low-wage industries, will be 
displaced); see also RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: 
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 342–50 (12th ed. 2016) (providing an empirical analysis of the net 
economic benefits of immigration, known as an immigration surplus, including to employers, who 
benefit from the supply of workers, workers in complementary industries experiencing demand and 
wage increases, and consumers, who benefit from lower prices). 
 87. This argument is concerned with the distribution of welfare benefits like insurance or 
access to healthcare. There are two ways to easily resolve this issue: (1) abandon the welfare state; 
or (2) delay access to benefits until one has significantly contributed to the system. See Alan O. 
Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158 (Warren F. 
Schwartz ed., 1995) (suggesting that one-way states may lessen the economic burden of immigrants 
is by excluding noncitizens from state entitlement programs). 
 88. Concerns over maintaining the security of a state, particularly prohibiting entry of 
terrorists, is easily answerable. First, it is unlikely that terrorists will be deterred from immigrating 
to a state if immigration is illegal. Second, the existence of temporary visas and allowance for short-
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potential harms to each United States citizen, as expressed by the 
aforementioned concerns, against the potential harm of barring entry 
for or terminating the residency of a noncitizen. In other words, one 
must employ the burdens principle. 
The arguments raised against open borders are both empirical and 
normative in their content. That is, it is not yet definitively 
demonstrable that the empirical conditions these arguments project 
will, in fact, come to fruition and each requires value judgments. For 
the sake of argument, one may prima facie accept these arguments and 
interpret them as possible harms to United States citizens, resultant 
from allowing noncitizens to enter or remain in the country. 
Reasonable rejection then requires one to weigh the concerns of 
preserving culture, sustaining the economy, distributing state benefits, 
and/or maintaining security against any harms that a noncitizen would 
suffer in this context. Depending on the particular situation of the 
noncitizen, the harms may vary. However, these harms commonly 
include a need to escape religious or political persecution, civil war or 
unrest, cultures of violence, oppressive regimes, poverty, or other 
forms of immediate threats to one’s life or safety. Given that 
reasonable rejection requires that the harm one would suffer from the 
performance of an action—in this case barring entry or terminating 
continued residence—must be greater than the harm others would 
suffer if the action was not taken—in this case the harms of having 
open borders—one must consider which harm would in fact be 
greater. 
Considering that the purported harms of open borders are 
generally aggregate harms (meaning a single noncitizen cannot 
constitute this harm), are empirically indeterminate, and often can be 
solved through reconsideration of economic or political structures, it 
appears that the definite and immediate harms to a noncitizen seeking 
entry or continued residence are more substantial. Additionally, as 
Thomas Nagel notes of Scanlon’s approach, morality does not allow 
for “promoting a collective human good in which the interests of a 
 
term travel make entry to the state possible. See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A 
Risk Analysis, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, Sept. 13, 2016, at 1, 15, 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf (comparing deaths by terror attack 
in the United States between 1975 and 2015 according to immigration status of the perpetrator, or 
the visa used by the perpetrator to enter the United States, and concluding that nonimmigrants on 
tourist visas have the highest rate of acts of terror, including the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks 
who entered on tourist B visas). 
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minority may be outweighed by the greater aggregate interests of a 
majority.”89 As such, the large-scale concerns of a citizenry cannot 
outweigh the concerns of an individual or a minority, such as 
noncitizens, with justifiable reason to enter or remain within the 
United States. Therefore, immigration policy enforcing closed borders 
requires unjustifiable actions on this account. 
To summarize the argument so far, on Scanlon’s contractualist 
account, noncitizens wishing to enter or remain within the United 
States would be bound by moral turpitude legislation even for actions 
taken prior to entering the United States because, as rational, 
autonomous agents, they should have known their conduct was 
unjustifiable. This effectively solves the vagueness charge against 
moral turpitude legislation. However, the other consequence of 
Scanlon’s contractualist approach is that the United States could not 
deny entry or continued residence to noncitizens who have not 
committed a crime involving moral turpitude because the burdens 
principle indicates that the harm to United States citizens in accepting 
noncitizens does not outweigh the harm to noncitizens of being turned 
away or deported. Consequently, the contractualist approach can make 
sense of and defend moral turpitude legislation, but it can only do so 
by employing an approach that would mandate open borders for any 
noncitizen who has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude. 
 It may be the case that there are valid objections to the issues and 
to Scanlon’s contractualist approach discussed above.90 Assuming the 
 
 89. Thomas Nagel, One-to-One, 21 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3, 4 (1999), 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n03/thomas-nagel/one-to-one. 
 90. As previously mentioned, the debate over open borders is complex, extensive, and well 
beyond the scope of this Article. For some philosophical sources on the open versus closed borders 
debate, see JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 225–54 (2013) (arguing that 
freedom of movement between states is a moral right and that closed borders “are incompatible 
with our deepest democratic values” and perpetuate a contemporary form of feudalism); PHILIP 
COLE & CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, DEBATING THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION: IS THERE A 
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE? 13–15 (2011) (making the case for the right to exclude based on the right of 
states to political self-determination, which includes the freedom of association and the freedom 
not to associate with those excluded); Stephen Macedo, The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration 
Policy: Open Borders Versus Social Justice?, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 63, 80–81 (Carol M. 
Swain ed., 2007) (arguing that open borders cannot be morally justified, under a Rawlsian 
conception of social justice, because immigration has a negative effect on the least-well-off 
segment of the United States population, such as poor, low-wage workers); David Miller, 
Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 363, 363–64 
(Andrew Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2d ed. 2014) (defending the concept of closed 
borders and restrictive immigration policies based on culture and population but limiting 
restrictions as they apply to the moral duty to admit certain groups of immigrants such as refugees); 
Walter Block, A Libertarian Case for Free Immigration, 13 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 167, 167–
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analysis is accurate and considered undesirable by some, however, 
there is another interpretation of Scanlon’s account—what will be 
called the “relativist interpretation”—that can be considered. The 
relativist interpretation does not solve the vagueness problem, but it 
does limit the scope regarding the agents to which one must justify 
one’s actions. 
The relativist interpretation of Scanlon’s theory recognizes the 
difficulty and perhaps undesirability of having to justify one’s actions 
to all rational, autonomous beings and, consequently, circumscribes 
our need to justify actions such that one only needs to take into 
consideration our compatriots or others to whom we have special 
relationships.91 Nagel, commenting on the work of Scanlon, states: 
There is room in Scanlon’s theory for a degree of relativism, 
in two senses. The first is what he calls ‘parametric 
universalism,’ according to which the appropriate ways to 
show respect for certain general values such as privacy or 
loyalty will vary with different social conventions or 
traditions. The second is that people in different social 
circumstances or from different traditions may have reasons 
to accept or reject different principles.92 
On the relativist interpretation then, the relativity of moral content is 
conditioned by one’s cultures and traditions, and therefore, one does 
not have to justify one’s actions to all rational, autonomous agents. 
That is, one would only have to justify one’s actions to those who 
share the same traditions and/or cultures. Consequently, on the 
relativist interpretation, it appears that the cultural preservation 
argument against open borders is saved, which may be important to 
someone who takes issue with the consequence of open borders from 
the original interpretation of Scanlon’s approach discussed previously. 
However, a consequence of limiting the scope of agents to which 
one must justify one’s actions is that others cannot justifiably be held 
 
68 (1998) (arguing in favor of open borders and freedom of movement from a libertarian 
perspective); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 
251, 251–52 (1987) (drawing on the moral theories of Robert Nozick, the utilitarian approach, and 
John Rawls, in particular, to argue that closed borders, and the inherent distinction between citizens 
and noncitizens, cannot be morally justified); Christopher H. Wellman, Immigration and Freedom 
of Association, 119 ETHICS 109, 109–11 (2008) (appealing to the freedom of association as a 
justification for the right of a state to close its borders to all forms of immigration, including 
refugees and asylum seekers). 
 91. See Nagel, supra note 89. 
 92. Id. 
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to a standard derived from “duties owed between man and man, either 
one’s fellow man or society in general”93 if they do not share the 
culture and traditions the standard is rooted in—in this case—
American culture and traditions. Consequently, on the relativist 
interpretation, crimes involving moral turpitude cannot be used to 
penalize—in this case, meaning deny entry to—those who are from 
different cultures or traditions. As such, the crimes involving the moral 
turpitude definition in the immigration context short-circuits itself 
because it can only be justifiably applied to United States citizens. 
That is, the “duties owed between man and man” cannot apply to 
noncitizens seeking entry to the United States because they do not 
share the same cultures or traditions. 
For those noncitizens who are seeking to remain in the country, 
the analysis is slightly different. On the relativist interpretation, those 
seeking to remain in the country would only be bound by the cultures 
and traditions of the United States once they had remained within the 
United States for the period of time necessary to learn and understand 
American culture and the traditions by which they would be bound. It 
would also require that noncitizens be treated identically to United 
States citizens within the legal system because there is no justifiable 
reason for differing treatment. If an action is unjustifiable for a 
noncitizen, then it would also be unjustifiable for a citizen, and 
therefore, sanctions ought to be similar. Consequently, deportation 
would not be a justifiable sanction for noncitizens because it is not a 
possible penalty for United States citizens. 
Taking the relativist interpretation of Scanlon’s theory seriously, 
one can justify closed borders using a cultural preservation argument, 
but one can only apply the crimes involving moral turpitude 
designation to United States citizens because noncitizens do not share 
the culture and traditions undergirding the concept. As such, it appears 
that the content of the Board’s definition of crimes involving moral 
turpitude, followed to its logical conclusion on the relativist account, 
is a nonsensical and impotent concept. 
In reviewing both interpretations of Scanlon’s approach as it 
applies to the crime involving moral turpitude in the immigration 
context, one can choose between two sets of consequences: (1) the 
original interpretation solves the vagueness problem but only if one 
 
 93. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980). 
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also adopts an open borders policy, effectively rendering the crime 
involving moral turpitude moot; or, (2) on the relativist interpretation, 
one takes a closed-border approach based on cultural preservation but 
also short-circuits the crime involving moral turpitude concept 
because it becomes an unjustifiable and unenforceable standard for 
evaluating the entry and continued residence of noncitizens. 
B.  The Crime Involving Moral Turpitude as Applied 
1.  Contextualizing an Intent-Driven Approach 
Contemporary moral theory, recognizing the complexity of 
making moral judgments in particular cases, focuses on the creation 
of moral systems that provide methods, most commonly guiding 
principles, based on conceptions of the right, such as actions that are 
right actions, and the good, meaning that which has intrinsic value, 
rather than trying to identify particular categories of action deemed 
moral or immoral.94 In creating moral theories based on conceptions 
of the right and the good, it is unnecessary to imagine all possible cases 
and contexts in which one may have to make moral judgments. Rather, 
one simply appeals to the moral system adopted to determine the 
method by which one would make such judgments, whether that be a 
method that favors analyzing actions, a method that favors prioritizing 
certain inherently valuable goods, such as virtuous character or well-
being, or some combination of the two. Consequently, the general 
approach of contemporary moral theory appears to be in direct tension 
with the categorical approach to moral turpitude designations taken by 
the Board and the courts.95 
There are reasons why adopting a particular moral system to 
make moral turpitude determinations is impractical. Most immediate 
is the expected difficulty of immigration adjudicators appropriately 
understanding and consistently applying complex moral theory. 
However, the complexity and discretion required by moral theory 
appears to be no more challenging to the individual than trying to 
understand and apply the current guidelines for turpitudinous conduct, 
 
 94. For an extensive discussion of the concepts of “right” and “good,” see DAVID ROSS, THE 
RIGHT AND THE GOOD 1, 65 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2002) (defining 
and discussing in-depth the meaning of “right” and what makes an act right, and the meaning, 
nature, and degrees of “goodness” and what makes a thing good, in the context of moral 
philosophy). 
 95. See infra Section III.A. 
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which have largely been informed by outdated and counterintuitive 
social norms regarding how a lady or gentleman should act in polite 
society.96 Consequently, the inherent complexity of moral theory does 
not appear to be a sufficient reason for the Board and the courts to 
sidestep its use. 
While there are obvious tensions between moral theory and how 
crimes involving moral turpitude have legally been constructed, it is 
worth considering whether one can, on any moral account, attempt to 
make sense of or charitably interpret the crime involving moral 
turpitude designation as a uniquely moral concept. To approach this 
task, consideration of contemporary moral theory in conjunction with 
the language used in the Board’s definition of “good moral character” 
can provide direction regarding which moral theories can most 
reasonably be used to assess the usefulness and plausibility of the 
crimes involving moral turpitude definition in moral terms. In 
determining on which theory one should base their analysis, 
consideration of the most prominent moral theories is necessary. 
Arguably, these theories include natural law theory, W.D. Ross’s 
account of prima facie duties,97 utilitarianism, feminist care ethics, 
virtue ethics, and deontology, primarily Kantian ethics.98 
Of these six moral theories, four can be discharged fairly quickly 
by examining the limits of the moral theories themselves as well as the 
contours of the crime involving moral turpitude definition and its 
practical application. Natural law theory, Ross’s prima facie duties, 
utilitarianism, and feminist care ethics are not natural allies for the 
moral turpitude designation. Taking natural law theory first, this 
approach traces back to St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth 
century.99 It is traditionally considered to be a theological approach 
because it sets forth a theory of intrinsic value favoring four basic 
human goods—life, procreation, knowledge, and sociability—
 
 96. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1021–23 (describing how courts have used prevailing 
social norms and “honor codes” to interpret the crime involving moral turpitude). 
 97. Ross’s account is not a legalist account; he uses the term “prima facie duties” to indicate 
that the moral duties we have, of which he has a particular, though non-exhaustive list, are all 
binding on us “on their face” but can be overridden by other, more compelling duties in a particular 
context. ROSS, supra note 94, at 19–20. 
 98. Many introductory textbooks to moral theory would include these six accounts, though 
some contemporary philosophers resist the inclusion of any theory beyond deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics as they constitute the traditional canon. 
 99. THOMAS AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS (Anton C. Pegis ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co., 1997) (1945). 
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considered to be objective facts about human nature, endowed by 
nature—that is, a transcendent being or God.100 On this approach, any 
action that violates any of the human goods is immoral.101 Given 
natural law theory’s close association with theological 
contextualization, in particular the Catholic tradition, it stands to 
reason that it would not be an appropriate theory to embed within 
United States law, given the Constitution’s protections regarding 
freedom of religion and the separation of church and state.102 
Additionally, given the plurality of religions practiced in the United 
States, intuitions about what is “normal” or “natural” for all human 
beings varies widely among individuals, including those charged with 
making decisions regarding turpitudinous conduct. Furthermore, a 
secularist approach to this theory would create further complications 
regarding how to define the normalcy or naturalness of humankind as 
there would be no obvious answer as to which account—biological or 
otherwise—should take priority. As such, it appears that the use of 
natural law theory within immigration law would render it vulnerable 
to charges of either importing a characteristically religious approach 
or favoring a secularist approach that is overly contentious. 
Next, on W.D. Ross’s prima facie duties approach, he adopts a 
plurality of prima facie duties that are binding on individuals at all 
times.103 However, when two or more duties conflict, the individual 
must consider which of the duties in question is an “all-things-
considered” duty—that is, the duty that should override all others.104 
Ross outlines seven prima facie duties: justice, beneficence, self-
improvement, nonmaleficence, fidelity, reparation, and gratitude.105 
Ross’s theory is one of few approaches that combines consequentialist 
and deontological approaches. Accordingly, his approach allows one 
to maintain that there are moral duties incumbent on us all but also 
that the context of the situation in which one finds oneself is of 
ultimate importance and therefore determines which moral duty 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 103. See ROSS, supra note 94, at 30–31. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 21. 
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should guide our actions in any particular circumstance.106 While this 
has been recognized as an exceptional contribution to moral theory on 
Ross’s part, when considering his theory as a potential approach to the 
crimes involving moral turpitude designation, one immediately is 
faced with the reality that the categorical approach employed to 
analyze crimes involving moral turpitude is the antithesis to Ross’s 
approach.107 He specifically developed his approach to avoid such 
simple categorizations because of a need to recognize the nuances of 
one’s context when making moral judgments.108 So, while Ross’s 
theory may provide a rather nuanced and intuitive approach to judging 
moral actions, it remains the case that it is in tension with the current 
categorical approach to crimes involving moral turpitude. 
Utilitarianism, while being one of the most popular and oft-
thought most intuitive moral theories, is not a viable approach to the 
crimes involving moral turpitude designation. The primary reason is 
that utilitarianism makes moral assessments on the basis of possible 
outcomes prior to the actions occurring, without any real concern for 
the actual consequences or outcomes of the action taken. This is 
largely in conflict with the point at which American law assesses 
actions—after the action has occurred and consequences are known—
and, consequently, the point at which crimes involving moral turpitude 
are evaluated. Utilitarianism, credited to the works of Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill, holds that the right action is the action that 
produces the most utility in the world.109 Utility is defined as well-
being, pleasure, or happiness, depending on which utilitarian theory 
one adopts.110 Whichever good one chooses to prioritize, one’s actions 
should be selected such that the action one chooses is the one that 
would maximize that particular good in the world, or that would at 
least minimize harm.111 In essence, the utilitarian maximizes the 
 
 106. Id. at 42 (“This sense of our particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded and 
informed by the fullest possible reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings, is highly 
fallible, but it is the only guide we have to our duty.”). 
 107. See infra Section III.A. 
 108. See ROSS, supra note 94. 
 109. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (Oxford Clarendon Press 1907) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 
(George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 2001) (1861). 
 110. BENTHAM, supra note 109, at 2 (defining the principle of utility). 
 111. Id. at 3 (“An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility . . . when 
the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish 
it.”). 
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greatest good for the greatest number.112 On this account, all 
individuals are considered equal and their achievement of good counts 
equally to that of any other. This framework has a nice leveling effect, 
but in practice it also means that there is no concept of individual rights 
because, in maximizing the aggregate good, one may be sacrificed 
(caused harm) if it means many others will experience a combined 
greater benefit. Taking this into account—and the fact that our legal 
system is founded on the conception of the importance of rights in 
protecting the individual—it seems that utilitarianism is a poor fit for 
any moral assessment within the law, including crimes involving 
moral turpitude. 
The last implausible approach, feminist care ethics, came into 
being during the 1980s when there began to be significant criticism of 
the canon of moral theory as male-centered because it favored the 
construction of the individual as autonomous and advanced a legalistic 
conception of moral theory as rights- and rule-based.113 Carol Gilligan 
and Nel Noddings are commonly credited with this approach and, in 
different ways, focus on constructing a theory that centers on the close 
personal relationships we share with one another and the 
responsibilities they generate.114 The focus, therefore, is not on an 
individual but on an individual inextricably linked to others.115 
Communitarianism, as a moral and political theory, also came about 
during this time, favoring a conception of the individual that was 
responsive to and/or constituted by one’s engagements with and 
commitments to the community.116 Both of these moral theories are in 
 
 112. Id. 
 113.  See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL 
EDUCATION (1984). 
 114. GILLIGAN, supra note 113, at 73 (exploring how women understand a “moral problem as 
a problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules”); 
NODDINGS, supra note 113, at 2–4 (interpreting ethical behavior in the context of natural caring, as 
between mother and child, as a means of including a feminine perspective in the field of ethics, 
traditionally dominated by masculine concepts, rigid rules, and cold principles). 
 115. See GILLIGAN, supra note 113, at 73, 98–100 (explaining how many women do not 
distinguish the self from the other when making moral decisions, but rather integrate a sense of 
responsibility for others into moral decision-making). 
 116. For examples of communitarian theories, see generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 3d ed. 2007) (critiquing the 
abstraction of traditional moral philosophy and arguing instead that morality must be understood 
in relation to the community); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d 
ed. 1998) (criticizing concepts of moral philosophy based on the metaphysical individual, such as 
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direct tension with the conception of the individual within American 
law. The United States has an inarguably autonomous conception of 
the individual within the law and within the American political system 
more generally. Therefore, while feminist care and communitarian 
approaches may serve as natural critiques of the American conception 
of the individual, it is not a viable theory for considering how to 
understand the crimes involving moral turpitude designation. 
However, in considering crimes involving moral turpitude, it is 
worthwhile to note that many countries and cultures do espouse a 
communitarian or feminist care ethic, making their moral assessments 
and laws decidedly different from those encoded in American law.117 
Therefore, a noncitizen may innocently, and with good moral 
intentions, act in a way that may be deemed morally turpitudinous 
under United States immigration law. This consideration raises issues 
regarding the reality of moral diversity in our world and perhaps the 
need to consider a significant degree of moral pluralism in the moral 
turpitude designation. 
The two theories that seem most naturally to apply to the case of 
crimes involving moral turpitude are virtue ethics and deontology, 
albeit for very different reasons. Considering the legal context within 
which crimes involving moral turpitude are situated, it appears 
reasonable that virtue ethics, specifically Aristotelian ethics, which is 
primarily concerned with an individual’s character when making 
moral assessments, may be useful in analyzing the moral justifications 
behind the designation.118 While consideration of the Board’s 
definition of crimes involving moral turpitude is not immediately 
suggestive of a virtue ethics approach, the designation ostensibly 
exists as a means for judging the moral character of those hoping to 
remain legally in the United States. Lacking an explicit standard in the 
moral turpitude definition, consideration of how good moral character 
is interpreted in the immigration context can be instructive. In 
particular, the “good moral character” requirement used as a standard 
 
Rawls and Dworkin, and arguing instead that the individual must instead be understood in context 
of her community and the moral obligations that stem of membership in a particular community). 
 117. Examples of a communitarian society would be China or Singapore. In these societies 
laws and policies are meant to protect the common good rather than the autonomy of each 
individuals. 
 118. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 18 (Terence Irwin ed. & trans. 2d ed. 
1999) (“Virtue of character . . . results from habit [ethos]; hence its name ‘ethical’, slightly varied 
from ‘ethos’.”). 
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in the naturalization process and for certain forms of relief from 
removal can provide insight into the immigration system’s 
understanding of moral character. Crimes involving moral turpitude, 
not including political or petty offenses, may trigger a bar on good 
moral character during this process. Consequently, crimes involving 
moral turpitude, within the context of immigration law generally, can 
be characterized as a means of assessing one’s character. As such, 
virtue ethics appears to be a useful approach. 
Taking Aristotle’s moral theory as representative of the virtue 
ethics tradition, he holds that moral actions are those that originate 
from an individual with good moral character or one who is 
virtuous.119 One develops character by practicing the virtues—that is, 
acting virtuously.120 Humans are not born virtuous.121 Rather, through 
the process of observing others who are exemplars of virtue we begin 
to understand what virtue is and through practicing virtuous behavior 
we become virtuous ourselves.122 That is, through habituation we 
become virtuous and develop good moral character.123 However, it is 
not enough to act virtuously because we recognize that it is something 
a virtuous agent would do; the action must flow from our character 
and the virtues we hold.124 Furthermore, Aristotle employs what has 
been referred to as “the golden mean” to determine what would be 
virtuous in a particular context.125 The virtuous action will be that 
action that is at the mean of two extremes, where the extremes are both 
excesses and, therefore, vices.126 For example, the virtue of courage is 
located at the golden mean between the vices of cowardice and 
 
 119. Id. at 9 (“And so the human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue . . 
. .”). 
 120. Id. at 18–20 (explaining that virtue of character develops though habit, by acting rightly 
or in accordance with virtue). 
 121. Id. at 18 (“Hence it is also clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us 
naturally.”). 
 122. Id. at 18–19 (explaining that “[v]irtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, 
by having first activated them” and likening development of virtue to learning the craft of building, 
playing the harp, or acting bravely). 
 123. Id. at 19 (“To sum it up in a single account: a state [of character] results from [the repetition 
of] similar activities.”). 
 124. Id. at 22 (differentiating between virtuous action and virtuous character). 
 125. Id. at 25. (“Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to 
us, which is defined by reference to reason . . . . It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and 
one of deficiency.”). 
 126. Id. 
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rashness.127 However, a courageous action will depend on the 
particular individual acting and the context of the situation.128 
Given this account of Aristotelian virtue ethics, it becomes clear 
that although crimes involving moral turpitude are employed as a 
means for assessing moral character, the notion of character being 
employed is far different from that which exists within moral theory. 
Taking the definition of good moral character—defined as “character 
which measures up to the standards of average citizens of the 
community in which the applicant resides”129—one can see that 
character assessment is not based on the actions of moral exemplars 
or virtuous human beings but rather on the standards “average 
citizens” determine through their actions. Furthermore, given the 
categorical approach130 to crimes involving moral turpitude, the 
requirement that virtuous conduct be sensitive to the context of the 
situation and the particular agent involved in the action, it is clear that 
turpitudinous conduct is not based on a philosophical notion of 
character, but rather the norms of society. 
Lastly, when one considers the Board’s definition, which defines 
moral turpitude as “a nebulous concept which refers generally to 
conduct which is base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules 
of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s 
fellow man or society in general,” the talk of “accepted rules of 
morality” and “duties owed” seems to indicate that a rule-based or 
duty-based approach to morality is at issue.131 This approach most 
naturally aligns itself with deontology, which, coming from the Greek 
words deon (duty) and logos (science or study of), literally means the 
study of duty.132 As with any moral theory, there are a number of 
adherents to the deontological method. However, Immanuel Kant’s 
moral theory133 is most appropriate for understanding turpitudinous 
 
 127. Id. at 28. 
 128. Id. at 29. 
 129. Good Moral Character, USCIS Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartF.html# 
footnote-1 (last updated Oct. 30, 2018); see also 8 C.F.R. 316.10(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he Service shall 
evaluate claims of good moral character on a case-by-case basis taking into account the elements 
enumerated in this section and the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence.”). 
 130. See infra Section III.A. 
 131. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 132. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Nov. 21, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/. 
 133. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor & 
Jens Timmermann eds., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2012) (1785). 
(7) 53.1_RODRIGUEZ&BULCOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  4:56 PM 
2019] MORAL THEORY AND TURPITUDINOUS CRIMES 75 
conduct because his approach focuses largely on one’s intentions, in 
particular, the intention to act in accord with the moral law or one’s 
moral duty. This approach is much more in line with the scienter 
requirement set forth in Silva-Trevino.134 As discussed in further detail 
below, however, the definitions of intention employed by Kant and the 
scienter requirement are different in crucially important ways. 
2.  Intent as the “Essence of Moral Turpitude” 
Lacking any coherent intellectual underpinning for moral 
turpitude, the Board and courts have largely retreated to a standard that 
elevates scienter, rather than considerations of morality, as its legal 
benchmark. As legal scholar Julia Ann Simon-Kerr avers, scienter has 
developed as a proxy for moral consideration and courts “apply an 
explicitly moral standard while deciding cases based on the 
completely decontextualized question, one which centers on the 
degree of intent required for a conviction, irrespective of a particular 
individual’s actual motivation, circumstances, or even conduct.”135 An 
analysis focused on intent provides judges a more manageable 
approach for legal determinations, but it fails to adhere to standards of 
morality. It is possible, nonetheless, to attempt to understand the 
Board and the courts’ focus on intent in terms of moral theory. 
Among moral theorists, Immanuel Kant sheds the most light on 
the approach developed to determine whether conduct involves moral 
turpitude in the immigration context, not because the courts have 
relied overtly on his moral propositions but due to the parallels that 
can be gleaned from their reasoning. Presumably unwittingly, seeing 
as there is no direct mention of moral philosophy in the relevant case 
law, the Board and the courts have developed a system of moral 
reasoning that represents a sort of legal corollary to Kantian ethics. 
Both moral turpitude determinations and Kant’s principles concerning 
morality coincide in their focus on intention rather than effect. If the 
Board and courts were to attempt to legitimize the intent-driven 
approach to moral turpitude with moral reasoning, Kant would provide 
their most effective support. In particular, Kant’s “Categorical 
 
 134. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 687 (B.I.A. 2008) (“To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude 
for purposes of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act, a crime must involve both reprehensible 
conduct and some degree of scienter, whether specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or 
recklessness.”). 
 135. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1062. 
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Imperative” provides the theoretical context in which to better 
understand the reasoning of the moral turpitude jurisprudence.136 
The Categorical Imperative developed by Kant is a normative 
ethical theory that seeks to provide a framework to determine that 
which is morally permissible and morally obligatory.137 Originally 
published in 1785, Kant’s theory intends to approach morality a priori, 
or independent of observable human reality or experience, rather than 
empirically.138 It rests on three primary propositions. First, to have 
moral worth, an action must be done from duty.139 Second, the action 
done from duty derives its moral worth from the maxim, or rule of 
conduct, by which it is determined, and therefore, depends “merely on 
the principle of volition by which the action has taken place,” not its 
purpose, object of desire, or effect attained.140 Third, duty is derived 
from the necessity of acting from respect for the law.141 When a maxim 
is established, all actions must be such that it “should become a 
universal law,” envisioning all rational beings to act in like fashion 
under comparable circumstances.142 
In Kant’s estimation, an action is only truly righteous when rooted 
purely in a sense of duty, independent of one’s disposition or concern 
for the consequences of one’s action.143 Critical to whether an action 
stems from a sense of duty is the intention underlying the action.144 It 
is the intention, not the desired outcome or effect, that determines the 
moral value of the act. Kant provides some explanatory examples to 
which he applies his principles, including suicide.145 For one whose 
choice to live supersedes the possibility of precipitating death, the 
morality of the action to maintain one’s life is contingent upon the 
intention to act from a sense of duty despite wishing for death, rather 
than a fear of death or inclination to continue living.146 The action to 
preserve one’s life, based in duty, must then be pursued only if the 
 
 136. See KANT, supra note 133, at xiii. 
 137. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 21–23 
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Dover Publ’ns 2005) (1785). 
 138. Id. at 25. 
 139. Id. at 23. 
 140. Id. at 24–25. 
 141. Id. at 25. In this context, by “law” Kant does not mean a system of legislative or judicial 
laws; rather, he is referring to moral rules. 
 142. Id. at 27. 
 143. Id. at 27–28. 
 144. Id. at 22–23. 
 145. Id. at 22. 
 146. Id. at 58. 
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preservation of life presents no logical contradictions in all instances 
of consideration of ending an undesired life.147 
Kant’s focus on intention is mirrored in the moral turpitude 
reasoning. For Kant, intention to act according to one’s duty is critical 
to moral action. A Kantian approach questions what may and must be 
done in moral terms. The Board and the courts have applied analogous 
logic to evaluate whether actions warrant moral opprobrium within the 
country’s immigration laws, focusing on the mens rea associated with 
particular offenses. While the Kantian approach and moral turpitude 
determinations regard intention as the touchstone of the morality of 
one’s actions, neither particularly gives regard to the role of effects. 
Kant contends that “the moral worth of an action does not lie in the 
effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires 
to borrow its motive from this expected effect.”148 Likewise, moral 
turpitude determinations look primarily to intent, irrespective of the 
relative effects of particular actions.149 
At first glance, tethering the Board and the courts’ analysis to 
Kant’s moral framework may appear to bolster the legitimacy of the 
intent-driven approach to moral turpitude determinations. This is not 
the case. Although Kant’s Categorical Imperative appears to be the 
most apt moral analogue to the moral turpitude designation, it 
ultimately does little to strengthen the approach taken by the Board 
and the courts, which have placed themselves in an untenable position 
with regard to moral turpitude. The current approach to moral 
turpitude renders it vulnerable to critique due to its lack of support 
from established moral standards. On the other hand, if the Board and 
the courts adopted an explicitly Kantian framework in order to bolster 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 26. 
 149. Perhaps as troubling as the lack of regard for moral principles are the egregious 
inconsistencies in moral turpitude determinations. While consequences are generally disregarded 
in moral turpitude cases, assault offenses provide one exception. In the immigration legal context, 
courts have considered the role of effects in finding that a crime involves moral turpitude when 
reckless assault results in serious bodily injury. In other words, despite the lack of intent typically 
required, courts have considered the resulting level of injury in justifying a finding of turpitudinous 
conduct for reckless action. See, e.g., Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 849 (8th Cir. 
2008) (finding that recklessly causing serious physical injury to another person is a crime involving 
moral turpitude because causing physical injury is an aggravating factor that increases the 
culpability of the offense); Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 478 (B.I.A. 1996) (“In order for an assault 
of the nature at issue in this case [simple assault] to be deemed a crime involving moral turpitude, 
the element of a reckless state of mind must be coupled with an offense involving the infliction of 
serious bodily injury.”). 
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its moral legitimacy, such an approach would continue to be 
vulnerable to attack on both legal as well as moral grounds. Several 
factors would contribute to casting a long shadow on the moral 
turpitude designation were a Kantian approach adopted by the Board 
and courts. 
First, it is important to acknowledge that the parallels between 
Kantian ethics and the current moral turpitude jurisprudence are 
limited. Although Kant’s theories represent the closest moral parallel 
to crimes involving moral turpitude, one’s confidence would be 
misplaced to accept that the moral turpitude jurisprudence has simply 
followed a Kantian approach, albeit unknowingly, and therefore holds 
moral integrity on those grounds. Even if the Board and the courts 
were to adopt an approach akin to the Categorical Imperative, it would 
be susceptible to critique absent adjustments to the moral turpitude 
reasoning. Ultimately, the failure of Kantian ethics to support the 
moral turpitude designation leads to the conclusion that there is no 
fitting moral theory for moral turpitude. 
For instance, incompatibilities arise in the respective approaches 
to intention. The coinciding focus on intention and indifference to 
effects provide poignant points of intersection between moral 
turpitude and Kantian ethics, but their approaches are an imperfect 
match. The notion of intention is fraught with complexity both in 
philosophy and in law.150 Whereas the law typically determines intent 
 
 150. Among philosophers, much attention has been given to the complexities of the notion of 
intention. See, e.g., G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 14 (2000) (describing the relationship 
between action and intention, which gives meaning to action); MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, 
PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 3–13 (1987) (expressing skepticism about philosophical theories 
of future-directed intention and instead introducing a functionalist “planning theory” to describing 
intention); GEORGE M. WILSON, THE INTENTIONALITY OF HUMAN ACTION 7–8 (1989) 
(approaching the concept of intention through the lens of philosophical language and providing a 
linguistic framework to discuss and describe intention); Luca Ferrero, Intending, Acting, and 
Doing, PHIL. EXPLORATIONS, Oct. 2017, at 13–14 (arguing that intending an action and acting are 
not conceptually distinct, but rather are part of a continuous, extended course of action). In the legal 
realm, legal scholars and courts have acknowledged the challenges of grappling with scienter. See, 
e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal 
Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 637 (1993) (“[F]ew conceptual pursuits in any 
area of the law have proven so beguiling as the attempt to give an accurate account of the so-called 
mental element required for criminal liability.”); Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The 
Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 26 (2001) (“The 
groundbreaking Model Penal Code attempted to exorcize this demon but failed in great part, instead 
simply adding more confusion to an already confused area.”); Frances Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (stating that “when it comes to attaching a precise meaning to mens 
rea, courts and writers are in hopeless disagreement”); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394, 403 (1980) (“Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the 
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within a range of mental states, Kant presents intention toward duty in 
contradistinction to fear and inclination. For Kant, intention is 
prospective, to be derived within a framework of individual freedom 
when faced with the possibility for action. In the moral turpitude 
context, immigration adjudicators conduct a retrospective 
examination related to the mental state required for particular offenses, 
which may or may not have been determined by a criminal court. For 
Kant, the locus of moral worth is strictly individualistic and purely 
internal, rooted in the reason of rational beings. In the moral turpitude 
context, external adjudicators determine moral worth of actions within 
standards established by precedent. 
Further incongruity between the Kantian and moral turpitude 
approaches presents itself in the conspicuous lack of consistency in 
the moral turpitude context. Despite the complexity and 
acknowledged impracticality of the Categorical Imperative, Kant 
successfully crafts a rule that provides a uniformity lacking in the 
realm of moral turpitude.151 For Kant, the moral analysis does not 
vary: act with intention for duty and eschew actions leading to 
resultant inconsistencies if the rule is applied universally. On the other 
hand, the Board and the courts have wielded the unruly definition of 
moral turpitude in an egregiously haphazard manner. To involve moral 
turpitude, some categories of offenses require intent, others qualify 
with diminished intent if particular factors are present, while others 
require no intent whatsoever. If the Board and the courts were to 
adhere to established moral standards and adopt a Kantian approach, 
their approach would require significant adjustment to achieve some 
semblance of consistency in moral terms. 
Second, even if the moral turpitude analysis were seamlessly 
analogous to Kant’s theories, it would be subject to scrutiny due to its 
 
mens rea required for any particular crime.”). This language from Bailey has been quoted by the 
First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. E.g., United States v. Lamott, 831 F.3d 
1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Tobin, 552 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 210 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 761 (10th Cir. 
1999); Gilmour v. Rogerson, 117 F.3d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Townsend, 987 
F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 151. Indeed, Kant has even been critiqued for attempting to create an adherence to law too 
closely resembling his thoughts on science and natural law. See Felix Adler, A Critique of Kant’s 
Ethics, 11 MIND 162, 167 (1902) (“There is, indeed, a capital difference between the certainties of 
science and those of ethics. The former are verified in experience while the latter are not capable 
of such verification. It cannot be proved, Kant tells us, that a single human being has ever obeyed 
the Categorical Imperative, that a single human being has ever pursued the line of conduct which 
yet he must admit to be universally binding.”). 
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outdated approach. The very existence of a moral turpitude 
designation within the country’s immigration laws has faced broad 
critique for its archaic nature.152 The fact that the closest moral 
analogue to the intent-driven approach rests in theory conceived in the 
eighteenth century does little to dispel this notion. Similar to the moral 
turpitude designation, detractors have considered Kant’s approach to 
morality outdated for decades. It is unquestionable that Kant has 
profoundly influenced the fields of ethics, natural science, and social 
science. Philosophers and scholars of philosophy, nonetheless, have 
continually commented on Kant’s ideas as antiquated and inadequate 
for application to particular present-day challenges.153 
Third, a Kantian approach to moral turpitude would be subject to 
critique on moral grounds. Since Kant developed his approach to 
morality in the eighteenth century, moral philosophers have subjected 
it to vigorous scrutiny on theoretical grounds, thereby eroding his 
moral theories. In particular, key facets of the Categorical Imperative 
have been insightfully scrutinized—from the impracticality of 
constructing maxims154 and the implausibility of formulating 
universal laws,155 to the deficiencies inherent in eschewing 
 
 152. See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (“It is 
preposterous that that stale, antiquated, and, worse, meaningless phrase should continue to be a part 
of American law.”); MARGARET REGAN, DETAINED AND DEPORTED 16 (2015) (describing moral 
turpitude as “an old-fashioned label with more than a hint of Victorian prurience”). 
 153. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE xliii (John Ladd trans., 
Hackett Publ’g. Co., 2d ed. 1999) (1797) (introducing the text of Kant’s work, translator and scholar 
John Ladd concludes that “Kant’s answers about ethics and law grew out of the problems of his 
day, his century, and he could not have anticipated present-day problems emerging from the 
Industrial Revolution and from advances in technology”); ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD 
AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 416 (E.F.J. trans., Dover Publ’ns 1966) (1819) (stating that, 
although he believed his nineteenth century contemporaries were mistaken, “many at the present 
day look upon [Kant’s works] as already antiquated”). 
 154. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1, 1 (1958) (“Concepts of 
obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right 
and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought,’ ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically 
possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of 
ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it.”). 
 155. See Adler, supra note 151, at 185, 189 (arguing that “practical moral commands are 
incapable of being derived from the Kantian formula” because the universalizing of actions “is 
based on the error that the same rule of action, adopted by all men, would lead in each case to the 
same result”); see also GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 58 (S.W. Dyde trans., Dover 
Publ’ns 2005) (1821) (stating that, without passing into the ethical system, the universalizing of 
one’s maxims is “reduced to empty formalism, and moral science is converted into mere rhetoric 
about duty for duty’s sake”). 
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motivations such as benevolence or compassion in decision making156 
and the oppressive implications of Kant’s views for subaltern 
peoples.157 Indeed, there is no dearth of criticism with regard to Kant’s 
views on morality. 
Given the complexity of moral thinking, any singular approach to 
moral turpitude genuinely adhering to principles of ethics would be 
subject to challenge on moral grounds. To adopt and defend a moral 
approach, the courts would be forced to grapple with questions that 
have “occupied the most gifted intellects and divided them into sects 
and schools carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another.”158 
Adopting a Kantian approach would be no exception. If the moral 
turpitude designation rested on Kantian principles, consequentialism 
would present particular challenges to Kant’s deontological approach. 
Consequentialists, such as John Stuart Mill, have critiqued an 
approach relying on a priori principles as lacking the requisite 
concrete specificity to guide right action.159 For Mill, a coherent 
system of morality must possess a self-evident central rule or a system 
to choose between conflicting principles.160 The moral turpitude 
designation lacks a central rule and the consistency to meet the 
standard Mill envisioned. 
To assess moral worth, moreover, a consequentialist approach 
seeks to examine the consequences and motivations of actions, factors 
generally ignored within the reasoning of the Categorical Imperative 
as well as the moral turpitude analysis.161 A consequentialist approach 
readily reveals contradictions in the intent-driven approach to moral 
 
 156. See SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 153, at 526–27 (“This demand by Kant that every 
virtuous action shall be done from pure, deliberate regard for and according to the abstract maxims 
of the law, coldly and without inclination, in fact contrary to all inclination, is precisely the same 
thing as if he were to assert that every genuine work of art must result from a well-thought-out 
application of aesthetic rules. The one is just as absurd as the other.”). In addition, Schopenhauer 
critiques Kant’s Categorical Imperative for being an elaborated and embellished version of the 
Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Id. 
 157. James Samuel Logan, Immanuel Kant on Categorical Imperative, in BEYOND THE PALE: 
READING ETHICS FROM THE MARGINS 69, 76–77 (Miguel A. De La Torre & Stacey M. Floyd-
Thomas eds., 2011) (concluding that, based on the contradictions between Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative and his odious defense of racial hierarchy, “[a]ll subaltern peoples of the world might 
do well to refuse the intellectual and moral dictates of the Categorical Imperative as formulated by 
Kant”). 
 158. MILL, supra note 109, at 1.                                
 159. Id. at 2–3. 
 160. Id. at 3. 
 161. It is important to note Mill’s unvarnished critique that, to be coherent, Kant’s test regarding 
logical contradictions must involve consideration of the consequence of actions. Id. at 4. 
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turpitude.162 For example, the moral turpitude analysis renders a 
noncitizen who commits a theft with the intent to deprive the owner 
permanently of her property susceptible to a charge of committing a 
crime involving moral turpitude.163 A noncitizen that commits a de 
minimis taking lacking the intent to deprive permanently, on the other 
hand, has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude and is not 
subject to the attendant immigration consequences.164 Yet, these 
outcomes are difficult to defend in moral terms, particularly when 
motivations and consequences enter the analysis. 
Imagine a noncitizen who intends to deprive permanently and 
commits a petty theft in order to provide medicine to her sick child; 
compare this scenario with a noncitizen who commits a temporary 
taking while engaged in “joyriding,” resulting in the victim’s losing 
her job because she was unable to drive herself to work in time for an 
 
 162. While the crime involving moral turpitude analysis generally does not consider effects or 
consequences of actions, there are exceptions. As the crime involving moral turpitude has continued 
to evolve and expand, effects have been incorporated into the Board’s analysis. For instance, simple 
assault offenses, which historically did not involve moral turpitude, are now turpitudinous crimes 
if serious bodily injury results, even if the offense is committed only recklessly. Fualaau, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 475, 478 (B.I.A. 1996) (“In order for an assault of the nature at issue in this case [similar 
to simple assault] to be deemed a crime involving moral turpitude, the element of a reckless state 
of mind must be coupled with an offense involving the infliction of serious bodily injury.”). In 
addition, theft offenses were traditionally only considered crimes involving moral turpitude when 
accompanied by the intent to deprive the owner permanently of her property. Grazley, 14 I. & N. 
Dec. 330, 333 (B.I.A. 1973) (finding that “a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral 
turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended”); H, 2 I. & N. Dec. 864, 865 (B.I.A. 
1947) (“[T]he element which must exist before the crime of theft or stealing is deemed one 
involving moral turpitude is that the offense must be one which involves a permanent taking as 
distinguished from a temporary one.”). In 2016, however, the Board significantly expanded seventy 
years of reasoning by broadening the definition of theft crimes that involve moral turpitude to 
include, not only the permanent intent to deprive, but also those “under circumstances where the 
owner’s property rights are substantially eroded.” Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 853 (B.I.A. 
2016). These developments in assault and theft offenses related to considering effects appear to be 
more a function of the Board’s intention to continue expanding the moral turpitude category, 
ensuring adverse immigration consequences for a broader range of noncitizens, rather than a 
principled approach to considering the importance of consequences in determining the moral worth 
of actions. Although their treatment has changed, theft offenses remain illustrative, nonetheless, of 
the inherent flaws in an intent-driven approach. 
 163. Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. at 853 (“[A] theft offense is a crime involving moral turpitude 
if it involves an intent to deprive the owner of his property either permanently or under 
circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded.”). 
 164. Alonso, 2018 WL 1872021, at *4–*5 (B.I.A. Jan. 23, 2018). Although Alonso is an 
unpublished decision, it provides insight to the Board’s view regarding joyriding offenses after 
Diaz-Lizarraga. See also D, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 145–46 (B.I.A. 1941) (holding that driving an 
automobile without the consent of the owner is not a turpitudinous offense because the statute 
reached cases where there was only an intent to temporarily deprive, which might involve mere 
prankishness). 
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important meeting. Further imagine that losing her job has caused 
devastating effects for the victim’s family. In moral terms, it is 
difficult to justify a finding that the petty thief is more morally 
depraved, as the moral turpitude analysis requires, than the temporary 
taker with dubious justifications and devastating effects related to her 
actions. As this example illustrates, the perfunctory determination 
required by the moral turpitude analysis—that an offense involving 
intentional conduct, regardless of motivation or consequences, 
involves moral turpitude—leads to indefensible results in moral terms. 
Lastly, Kant’s own broader theories present perhaps the most 
formidable obstacle to a Kantian framework to moral turpitude. In 
particular, Kant’s theories concerning justice undermine an approach 
utilizing law to regulate conduct on moral grounds. In Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice, Kant draws sharp distinctions between internal 
and external legislation.165 Legislation derived external to the will of 
a person, although it may influence duty and ethics, cannot dictate 
morality.166 While external factors may impact moral determinations, 
they may not enjoin moral action.167 In the realm of ethics, legislation 
must be of internal derivation, commanding individuals to act 
according to individual duty. Kant unequivocally concludes that 
internal, ethical determinations must be created, to some extent, 
independent of external legislation.168 In Kant’s estimation, even God 
is incapable of externally legislating morality. Kant argues: 
Duties arising from juridical legislation can only be external 
duties because such legislation does not require that the Idea 
of this duty, which is internal, be of itself the ground 
determining the will of the agent. Because such legislation 
still requires a suitable motive for the law, it can only join 
external motives with the law. In contrast, ethical legislation 
also makes internal actions duties, without, however, 
excluding external actions. Rather, it applies generally to 
everything that is a duty. But, for the very reason that ethical 
legislation incorporates in its law the internal motive of the 
action (the Idea of duty), which is a determination that must 
by no means be joined with external legislation, ethical 
 
 165. KANT, supra note 153, at 24. 
 166. Id. at 23–24. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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legislation cannot be external (not even the external 
legislation of a divine Will), although it may adopt duties that 
rest on the external legislation and take them, insofar as they 
are duties, as motives in its own legislation.169 
Though impossible to divine Kant’s thinking as it would pertain 
to modern legal classifications, a Kantian approach to moral regulation 
through legal means appears, at best, dubious. Legal scholar George 
P. Fletcher argues that although a conventional approach “treats law 
and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view 
treats the two as distinct and nonintersecting. The moral does not 
petition for inclusion in the legal and the legal cannot determine the 
moral.”170 Fletcher finds that “Kant’s teachings enable us to fathom 
the claim that we cannot legislate morality.”171 Juridical legislation 
exists in the external realm; therefore, it is incapable of establishing 
independent ethical duties and rendering moral determinations. The 
crime involving moral turpitude represents an external legal 
classification regulating noncitizen actions in explicitly moral terms, 
bestowing courts and the Board with a mechanism to act as external 
moral arbiters. As a positive law classification embedded within 
juridical legislation, the moral turpitude designation runs contrary to 
Kant’s notions of morality and justice.172 
Kant’s theories on justice are also at odds with the honor norms 
reflected in the crime involving moral turpitude category. Kant 
espouses honor norms, but his approach differs markedly from the 
crime involving moral turpitude. With regard to moral turpitude, the 
courts have historically lent leniency to assault offenses, presumably 
as a reflection of duel culture and a society permissive of violence as 
a means to defend men’s honor.173 Kant, on the other hand, does not 
condone assault. Instead, his approach generally condemns assault and 
homicide as actions that, if left unpunished, may result in societal 
regression to the state of nature.174 With uncharacteristic clarity and 
specificity, however, Kant carves out exceptions for particular 
 
 169. Id. at 23. 
 170. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 
534 (1987). 
 171. Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173. Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1015. 
 174. KANT, supra note 153, at 141. 
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homicide offenses.175 Specifically, Kant advises mercy for both 
soldiers who kill those insulting their honor as well as unwed mothers 
who slay their illegitimate children.176 Unlike the moral turpitude 
designation, the honor norm exceptions conjured by Kant rest not on 
intent or protection of property but the social position or circumstances 
of the offender. 
Although cursory, Kant gives direct consideration to deportation 
in his writings on justice.177 Kant is a proponent of expulsion, yet he 
does not view it as a means to regulate morality.178 Instead, Kant 
proposes deportation as a mechanism to protect society from 
dangerous individuals, regardless of immigration status as conceived 
today.179 By contrast, the standard for crimes involving moral 
turpitude disregards “dangerousness,” focusing largely instead on 
deceit and intent. The crime involving moral turpitude contributes to 
a system of deportation far more expansive than that imagined by 
Kant, leading to the removal of people who commit even minor, 
relatively innocuous offenses that do not place others in peril. A 
Kantian approach simply does not envision deportation as a means to 
regulate, dictate, or banish on moral grounds. 
IV.  LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL DETERMINATIONS 
In addition to its significant limitations as a moral classification, 
the crime involving moral turpitude faces additional challenges when 
examined in its broader context. As a legal classification, crimes 
involving moral turpitude must sustain a moral analysis within well-
established legal doctrines, such as the categorical approach and stare 
decisis. As discussed in this section, each poses unique challenges to 
an explicitly moral category embedded within the law. In particular, 
the crime involving moral turpitude is susceptible to critique because 
it perpetuates questionable, decontextualized moral judgments as well 
as moral determinations locked within a relatively rigid system of 
precedents. 
 
 175. Id. at 141–43. 
 176. Id. at 143. 
 177. Id. at 145. 
 178. Id. at 145–46. 
 179. Id. at 145 (“In the case of a subject [regarded also as citizen] who has committed a crime 
that makes association with his fellow citizens dangerous to the state, the country’s ruler has the 
right to banish that person to a province outside the country, where he will no longer participate in 
any of the rights of a citizen; that is, he may be deported.”). 
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A.  The Categorical Approach 
Subject to a categorical, decontextualized analysis, moral 
turpitude determinations are based on evaluations of the elements of 
particular criminal statutes rather than a factual inquiry into 
noncitizens’ actions.180 Among moral theories, nearly all necessitate a 
contextualized approach to moral considerations. While essential in 
the legal context, a decontextualized inquiry to crimes poses 
significant challenges for a moral category in the law. In particular, 
immigration adjudicators render perfunctory moral determinations 
with little regard for the nuance necessary in the complex realm of 
morality. 
Stemming from sentencing enhancement determinations in 
criminal cases,181 the categorical approach is employed in the 
immigration context to determine whether offenses, including 
potential crimes involving moral turpitude,182 trigger particular 
immigration consequences.183 To determine whether a conviction 
 
 180.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
 181. Id. (applying “a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of 
the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.”); see also Mathis 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (“To determine whether a prior conviction is for 
generic burglary (or other listed crime) courts apply what is known as the categorical approach: 
They focus solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the 
elements of generic burglary, while ignoring the particular facts of the case.”); Descamps v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013) (describing the categorical approach and the modified categorical 
approach previously approved by the Supreme Court for determining sentencing enhancements); 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) (“When the law under which the defendant has 
been convicted contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which 
require violent force and some of which do not, the ‘modified categorical approach’ that we have 
approved . . . permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction 
by consulting the trial record . . . .”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that 
a later sentencing court “is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by 
the trial judge to which the defendant assented” and may not look at other documents to 
contextualize the conviction, such as police reports”). 
 182. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Att’y Gen. 2015) (vacating a previous decision 
by Attorney General Mukasey on how to apply the categorical approach and leaving the Board to 
develop a uniform standard for applying the categorical approach to the crime involving moral 
turpitude). 
 183. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2018) (applying the categorical approach to 
first-degree burglary under California law and finding the respondent deportable); Esquivel-
Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017) (finding that a California statutory rape law 
does not constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes after applying the categorical 
approach); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986–88 (2015) (applying the categorical approach 
to a drug paraphernalia conviction and finding the respondent not deportable); Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 192–95 (2013) (applying the categorical approach and finding that 
respondent’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute under Georgia law is not an 
aggravated felony); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (rejecting the categorical approach 
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forms the basis for adverse immigration action, adjudicators must 
compare the elements of the relevant criminal statute to the generic 
immigration definition. If the generic definition encompasses all 
conduct within the statute of conviction, it is a categorical match, 
resulting in the attendant immigration consequences. If there is at least 
a reasonable probability of prosecution for conduct not encompassed 
by the generic definition, the offense is not a categorical match, and 
the immigration consequences are not applicable. When the relevant 
offense is divisible, meaning the criminal statute is comprised of 
different elements, some of which satisfy the generic definition, courts 
employ the modified categorical approach.184 The modified 
categorical approach allows adjudicators to look beyond the statute to 
particular documents within the record of conviction—such as the 
indictment, jury instructions, plea agreement, and plea colloquy—for 
the purpose of determining the crime of which the individual was 
convicted.185 Generally speaking, the categorical approach prohibits 
factual inquiry.186 
Among moral theories, Kant’s Categorical Imperative again 
provides the closest moral analogue to the categorical approach. 
Kant’s framework parallels the categorical approach in its objective, 
decontextualized determinations. Whereas the categorical approach 
 
for circumstance-specific aggravated felony, “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which 
the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000,” which is distinguishable from the more generic crimes 
included in the definition of aggravated felony in the INA); Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819, 
821–22 (B.I.A. 2016) (applying the categorical approach to determine if a firearms offense under 
Utah law is a crime of violence). 
 184. Although the need for a modified categorical approach was anticipated in Taylor, Shepard 
was the first Supreme Court case in which it was employed. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16–17; see also 
Michael McGivney, Comment, A Means to an Element: The Supreme Court’s Modified 
Categorical Approach After Mathis v. United States, 107 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 421, 427 
(2017) (explaining that the Court in Taylor imagined a hypothetical generic offense that would 
require a modified approach, which the Shepard Court was the first to apply). 
 185. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. 
 186. But see Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38–40 (allowing circumstance-specific approach for the 
amount of loss in aggravated felony determinations); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 705 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (allowing circumstance-specific approach for sex offense); United States v. Rogers, 804 
F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (7th Cir. 2015) (allowing fact-based inquiry related to consenting adult 
exception in sex offense); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132 (10th Cir. 2015) (using 
circumstance-specific approach to determine age in sex offense); United States v. Gonzalez-
Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 429–31 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying circumstance-specific approach to 
determine age differential in sex offense); Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 408, 410–12 
(B.I.A. 2014) (allowing circumstance-specific approach for personal use exception in controlled 
substance determinations); Davey, 26 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A. 2012) (allowing circumstance-
specific approach to determine whether noncitizen was involved in single offense for personal use 
in controlled substance determinations). 
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prohibits adjudicators from making contextualized, factual inquiries 
in legal determinations, Kant’s method renders factual basis and 
effects relatively immaterial to moral assessments. Both categorical 
analyses hold general categories of actions to a generic standard in 
determining, in the case of morality, their moral worth and, in the case 
of crimes involving moral turpitude, their applicability to established 
immigration standards. While parallels exist between the two 
approaches, on the other hand, their juxtaposition exemplifies yet 
another stark contrast that emerges in conflating legal and moral 
approaches. While not without its challenges, the decontextualized 
nature of the categorical approach seems well-suited to a legal 
determination and has been upheld repeatedly to ensure fairness for 
individuals facing deportation or lengthier sentences. In contrast, 
Kant’s reasoning has been widely critiqued because of the sometimes 
absurd results stemming from such an unwavering approach in moral 
thinking.187 
With the exception of Kant’s fairly anomalous and vehemently 
critiqued method, the plurality of moral theories eschews a 
decontextualized approach to moral considerations. Generally 
speaking, moral frameworks contemplate the underlying motives, 
context, and effects of particular actions. As such, a legal categorical 
approach that evaluates the moral relevance of crimes, such as in 
moral turpitude determinations, lacks support among most moral 
theories, which require a more contextualized inquiry. Indeed, a 
categorical approach to crimes prohibits consideration of, for instance, 
the effects of actions necessary within a utilitarian analysis, the 
significance of moral exemplars in virtue ethics, and the importance 
of theistic considerations in natural law theory. Absent the ability to 
contextualize its analysis beyond evaluating the elements of criminal 
 
 187. Perhaps the epitome of Kant’s critiqued examples is the “murderer at the door,” in which 
Kant condemns lying to a murderer seeking a victim in one’s home. See Helga Varden, Kant and 
Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to 
Murderers and Nazis, 41 J. SOC. PHIL. 403, 403 (2010). According to Kant’s reasoning, for 
instance, Miep Gies, if asked, may have had a moral obligation to tell S.S. officers that the Frank 
family was hidden in their home because lying is categorically immoral. Id.; see also Michael 
Cholbi, The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said, 79 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RES. 17, 19–20 (2009) (arguing that lying in the above situation is actually morally required 
because of the duty of self-preservation combined with the duty to treat others similarly situated to 
ourselves in a similar fashion); James Edwin Mahon, Kant on Lies, Candour and Reticence, 7 
KANTIAN REV. 102, 123 (2003) (exploring the scope of the prohibition against lying and suggesting 
that the intended scope is narrow). 
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statutes, a categorical approach to moral determinations renders itself 
vulnerable to the scrutiny of a variety of moral approaches. In 
contemporary notions of moral theory, a categorical approach to moral 
determination is essentially untenable. 
To be sure, neither adopting a Kantian approach nor undermining 
the categorical approach would remedy the challenges associated with 
a decontextualized approach to moral turpitude determinations. As 
previously discussed, a Kantian approach to moral turpitude, while the 
most viable option for an adoptable moral approach for courts, is rife 
with flaws and contradictions. Furthermore, it seems unwise to modify 
or jettison the categorical approach for the sake of salvaging the deeply 
flawed crime involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court has 
clearly spoken as to the importance of the categorical approach to 
crimes.188 To exempt crimes involving moral turpitude from 
categorical analyses would lead to further incoherence in an already 
inconsistent area of law. To abandon the categorical approach 
altogether would inevitably lead to the significant problems the 
Supreme Court has previously addressed—such as failing to adhere to 
congressional intent,189 causing the practical difficulties and potential 
unfairness of a factual inquiry,190 and potentially violating the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury.191 
B.  Stare Decisis 
If one is still unwilling to abandon crimes involving moral 
turpitude in totality, despite the litany of aforementioned critiques, 
there remain further considerations regarding the use of stare decisis 
in moral turpitude cases. As is commonly understood, stare decisis 
mandates that one is bound by case precedent when deciding new 
cases.192 In the context of crimes involving moral turpitude there are 
two concerns: (1) that stare decisis allows for personal morality to be 
 
 188. See supra note 181. 
 189. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 580 (1990) (discussing Congress’ intent in 
defining burglary for the purpose of the statute). 
 190. Id. at 601 (“[T]he practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are 
daunting.”). 
 191. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (explaining how the 
categorical approach avoids Sixth Amendment concerns “that would arise from sentencing courts’ 
making findings of fact that properly belong to juries”). 
 192. H. Campbell Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG. 745, 745 (1886) 
(describing the principle of stare decisis, which is the policy of courts to abide by the decisions of 
previous courts in subsequent litigation rather than disturb settled law). 
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encoded into the law on a larger scale than previously discussed; and 
(2) that stare decisis actually impedes the concept of crimes involving 
moral turpitude from making moral progress without timely and 
difficult attempts to repeal outdated precedents. 
Regarding the first concern, since stare decisis is a common and 
widespread practice within the law, one would think there is no special 
harm in employing it in the cases of crimes involving moral turpitude. 
However, because crimes involving moral turpitude were intentionally 
crafted such that “the Board and other immigration officials are both 
required and entitled to flesh out its meaning,”193 there is reason to be 
concerned with how cases are decided and what additional influence 
personal morality will have on future cases through precedent. As 
explained previously, it is problematic, yet seemingly unavoidable, for 
judges to codify their own personal morality into the law when making 
decisions regarding moral turpitude cases. This concern is, therefore, 
exacerbated when one considers that it is not only binding on 
individual cases but also on all of the cases that follow. As was also 
mentioned above, similar concerns were raised by Justice Jackson in 
his dissent in Jordan v. De George, although he did not explicitly 
consider the additional harms brought about by precedent.194 As 
Justice Jackson proclaimed, the infusion of personal morality into the 
law “is not government by law.”195 Consequently, the heavy reliance 
on precedent in moral turpitude cases compounds the initial harm of 
allowing personal morality to guide a judicial decision. That is, a 
judge’s personal morality not only affects contemporary decisions, but 
future decisions as well, even when a judge’s personal morality may 
not only be in contention with the moral sentiments of others but an 
anathema to the general social norms of the day. 
Regarding the second concern, the creation of the crimes 
involving moral turpitude category without an exhaustive list of 
crimes to fill out the definition indicates that Congress wanted a 
concept that was fluid and could easily change over time—that is, one 
that would be capable of mirroring moral progress. This idea is further 
reinforced when one considers that the introduction of a list of 
aggravated felonies in 1988 did not supplant the crimes involving 
moral turpitude category. As Wolper points out: 
 
 193. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 194. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239–40 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 240. 
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Congress presumably maintained the category of [crimes 
involving moral turpitude], notwithstanding the addition of 
the aggravated felony category, because it believed [crimes 
involving moral turpitude] would continue to provide some 
benefit. Unlike the list of aggravated felonies, [the crime 
involving moral turpitude] remains a fluid category that can 
adapt over time without legislative involvement.196 
An ideal interpretation is that the fluidity provided by the crime 
involving moral turpitude allows it to be responsive to the times and 
to capture the prevailing moral concerns of the day rather than being 
constrained by a static law that requires legislative involvement or 
judicial repeal to make any sort of progress. 
However, stare decisis and the heavy reliance on precedent within 
moral turpitude decisions certainly qualifies, if not disproves, this 
claim. This is especially true when one considers the sua sponte 
response to vagueness by the Jordan v. De George majority, in which 
it states,  
In view of these decisions, it can be concluded that fraud has 
consistently been regarded as such a contaminating 
component in any crime that American courts have, without 
exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral 
turpitude. It is therefore clear, under an unbroken course of 
judicial decisions, that the crime of conspiring to defraud the 
United States is a “crime involving moral turpitude.”197 
Therefore, one can interpret the Court as stating that moral 
turpitude law is not vague because precedent has the power to guide 
one in determining what constitutes a turpitudinous action. This 
interpretation gives substantial power to any precedent as it essentially 
functions as the guiding force of the law in moral turpitude 
designations. Further, it also arrests the notion of moral progress 
because it is not sufficient for one to ask what morality would have 
one do but rather what precedent would have one do. Current morality 
and the morality encoded in precedent may conflict because they are 
the products of different time periods with potentially different social 
and moral norms. Given that precedent is binding until it is overturned, 
 
 196. Wolper, supra note 9, at 1938. 
 197. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229. 
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the morality encoded in a precedent determined years, if not decades 
before, will still be binding. 
Using a precedential standard informed by outdated moral norms 
appears to nullify all claims of fluidity within the law and also 
introduces unpredictable and contentious moral norms as a means for 
guiding and evaluating actions. Julia Ann Simon-Kerr expresses 
similar concerns as she notes, “[I]n the years since it entered American 
common law, moral turpitude has preserved, but not transformed, the 
set of morally framed norms of the early nineteenth century that first 
shaped its application.”198 This preservation can be seen by the 
primacy given to prostitution and fraud within crimes involving moral 
turpitude. That is, it reflects the “early honor code [of the nineteenth-
century that] was gendered, condemning a lack of chastity in women 
and deceptive business practices and dishonesty in men.”199 In effect, 
“modern moral turpitude jurisprudence simply mimics a nineteenth-
century system of values.”200 As such, Congress’s initial hope that 
crimes involving moral turpitude would be flexible and responsive to 
the time in which it was applied simply has not been the practical 
upshot of its use. It also seems clear that the reluctance of judges to 
engage with moral thought has led to an overreliance on precedent in 
making moral turpitude determinations. Judges, not wanting to be 
moral arbiters, have sidestepped the role of moral arbiters by deferring 
to precedent that may not be reflective of contemporary values. 
Consequently, this deference to precedent serves to arrest moral 
progress within moral turpitude law and also exacerbates concerns 
regarding the codification of personal morality within the law. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As Justice Kagan affirms in Mathis v. United States,201 
“[c]oherence has a claim on the law.”202 For decades, the vague and 
arbitrary nature of the moral turpitude designation has perplexed 
practitioners, judges, and legal scholars. Absent a central rule and 
consistent application of a legal standard, the crime involving moral 
turpitude lacks legitimacy as a legal classification. Additionally, the 
 
 198. Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 1008. 
 199. Id. at 1007. 
 200. Id. 
 201. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 202. Id. at 2257. 
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moral turpitude designation lacks coherence as a moral designation. In 
rendering moral turpitude determinations, adjudicators overlook 
established notions of morality, applying instead a contrived notion of 
right and wrong to minor offenses and morally defensible actions. 
There exists no individual moral framework effectively able to lend 
credence or integrity to the moral turpitude designation. Even earnest 
attempts to bolster the designation with contemporary moral theory 
fail. The crime involving moral turpitude continues to represent an 
intractable impediment to a coherent system of immigration law and 
policy. 
Perpetuating the application of the crime involving moral 
turpitude is, somewhat ironically, an act of intellectual dishonesty. The 
moral turpitude designation reflects, at best, the judiciary’s complicity 
or, at worst, its intent to wield morality as a means to restrict the 
movement of broad categories of noncitizens. While moral turpitude 
purports to exclude and remove the vile and depraved from the 
country, it instead acts as an instrument of social constraint, excluding 
or removing broad swaths of noncitizens who may have engaged in 
even petty offenses. It has done so shrouded in moral terms, thereby 
diminishing the chances of public opposition to a designation that 
ostensibly preserves the country’s moral ethos. With its moral veneer, 
the moral turpitude designation ensures its continued existence as a 
mechanism to limit the movement of significant numbers of aspiring 
immigrants. 
The crime involving moral turpitude represents the perpetuation 
of an injustice within American jurisprudence. Congress introduced 
the moral turpitude designation when the nation’s laws explicitly and 
systematically subjugated women, people of color, and noncitizens. 
While the law generally has evolved since that time to be more neutral, 
at least on its face, in its treatment of historically marginalized people, 
the crime involving moral turpitude has continued to expand to 
adversely impact larger numbers of noncitizens. As a practical matter, 
moral turpitude has served to limit the movement of people 
experiencing, and resisting through migration, the devastating effects 
of entrenched colonialism, systemic racism, and global inequality. 
Given its myriad failings, the moral turpitude designation must be 
eliminated from the country’s immigration laws. The nation’s 
collective conscience cannot tolerate otherwise. 
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